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THE EFFECT OF LIFTING THE BLINDFOLD FROM CIVIL JURIES CHARGED 
WITH APPORTIONING DAMAGES IN MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT CASES: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
Leibman, Jordan H. 
Bennett, Robert B. 
Fetter, Richard 
INTRODUCTION  
Among the most contentious issues in American procedural law is the question of how much 
civil juries should be told about the legal consequences of their findings. One view holds that the 
jury's role should be no more than that of fact-finding tribunal having no legitimate interest in the 
ultimate outcome of the lawsuit.(n1) In this view, it is within the judge's function to fashion the 
ultimate-outcome judgment by applying the jurisdiction's law to the facts as determined by the 
jury. Information beyond what is necessary to try the facts in dispute should be withheld from 
the jury lest it be tempted by sympathy or bias to veer from an objective appraisal of the 
evidence to weigh it instead in accordance with a predetermined and desired outcome. In 
jurisdictions where this view predominates, "blindfold" rules prohibit disclosure to the jury, 
either by instruction or implication, of some or all of the legal consequences of the jury's 
findings.(n2)  
Another view sees the jury as an institution of last resort with the power to exercise the 
conscience of the community, even in derogation of the law, if that is necessary to achieve just 
results in individual cases.(n3) One proponent of this view observes that many questions deemed 
factual are really "mixed questions that jump the artificial law/fact boundary. This is true in 
negligence cases, where juries decide the fact of whether a defendant's behavior fell below the 
behavior expected of a reasonable person."(n4) To answer "factual" questions such as this in 
ignorance of the answers' consequences can produce arbitrary, inequitable, and unintended 
results. Moreover, efforts to blindfold juries are often ineffective or counterproductive as jurors 
will seek to infer, correctly or incorrectly, the economic effects of their verdicts on the parties. 
For these reasons, opponents of blindfolding would admit the sunshine of legal knowledge into 
the jury room. In jurisdictions where this view predominates, we find what we will refer to as 
"sunshine" rules requiring or permitting the legal consequences of jury findings to be revealed to 
the jury.(n5)  
One of the most troublesome jury disclosure problems is encountered under systems of modified 
comparative fault. Under modified comparative fault, plaintiffs are barred from all recovery if 
the trier of fact finds their percentage of fault to be equal to or above some specific threshold, 
generally either fifty or fifty-one percent. In this article, we refer to this threshold as the 
percentage bar to the plaintiffs recovery or percentage bar. In jurisdictions where there is a fifty-
one percent bar to recovery, a plaintiff fifty percent at fault can still recover fifty percent of her 
damages; in jurisdictions with a fifty percent bar the fifty-percent-at-fault plaintiff recovers 
nothing.(n6) The question of whether to inform the jury about the existence of a percentage bar 
is critical because a single percentage point difference in determining the degree of plaintiff's 
fault can have a drastic result: a half recovery versus no recovery. For that reason, blindfolding 
proponents argue that the percentage bar rule must be kept from the jury to reduce the effects of 
sympathy and bias. Opponents argue that the comparative fault jury's task of quantifying 
culpability requires the jurors to make moral judgments; to do so, triers of fact need to know 
what consequences attach to their fault determinations.  
Until recently, these opposing arguments have been primarily doctrinal, focusing on procedural 
rule regimes likely to produce the most balanced, therefore the fairest, forum for trial.(n7) In 
1995, however, as part of a national tort reform movement, the Illinois General Assembly 
enacted a far-reaching set of amendments to its tort statutes(n8) that were expressly designed to 
reduce the liability exposure of a number of constituencies often found to be defendants in tort 
cases.(n9) Reducing the liability burden on manufacturers and presumably other employers as 
well "helps them to do what they're supposed to be doing: creating jobs and helping our economy 
grow free from the worry of unwarranted lawsuits."(n10)  
Illinois is among the many states that maintain systems of modified comparative fault.(n11) The 
Illinois legislature saw the disclosure rules governing jury instructions in tort cases as primarily 
an economic or "tort reform" issue. If jury sympathy and bias generally favor plaintiffs, a 
measure that reduces the potential for exercising these impulses would appear to favor 
defendants. Therefore, if juries know that attributing fifty or fifty-one percent of the fault for 
injuries to plaintiffs will bar them from all recovery, it would seem that the aggregate economic 
burden to defendants can be reduced by eliminating this information from the juries' 
deliberations. Apparently persuaded by this reasoning, the Illinois legislature, in the 1995 
amendments, moved from a mandated sunshine rule to a mandated blindfold rule with respect to 
the existence of a percentage bar to recovery.(n12)  
Legislation designed to produce an economic effect should, if at all possible, be tested 
empirically, preferably before enactment. To that end, we have developed and performed an 
experiment to compare the effect of a blindfold rule that prohibits disclosure of a percentage bar 
to recovery with that of a sunshine rule that requires disclosure of that information to the jury.  
In this article, we begin, by way of background, with a discussion of the origins and development 
of comparative fault in the United States.(n13) We then trace the interesting history of blindfold 
rules, focusing specifically on the prohibition against disclosing the existence of a percentage bar 
under modified comparative fault.(n14) We then describe the experiment and conclude from its 
data that a sunshine rule does cause juries, on average, to increase the percentage of fault 
attributable to defendants, thus generating more frequent awards to plaintiffs.(n15) However, the 
data also indicate that sunshine juries make smaller awards, so that the aggregate economic 
impact of implementing the sunshine rule appears to be statistically insignificant.(n16)  
The experiment also provides a comparative measure of the economic effects of the four 
principal defensive rule regimes: 1) contributory negligence as a complete defense;(n17) 2) pure 
comparative fault;(n18) 3) modified comparative fault under the blindfold rule;(n19) and 4) 
modified comparative fault under a sunshine rule(n20)  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
The Origins and Development of Comparative Fault  
In this article, the authors use the term comparative fault to refer to any system in which the 
responsibility for an injury is assigned to the parties by the trier of fact in proportion to the 
parties' wrongful conduct that proximately caused the injury. The species of conduct deemed to 
be "fault" varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Fault might include acts or omissions of 
ordinary negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, willful or wanton conduct, 
recklessness, conduct deemed tortious under strict liability principles, breach of implied or 
express warranty, and, in one state, intentional conduct.(n21) We use the term comparative 
negligence to refer to systems of comparative fault under which only conduct that can be 
characterized as negligence is to be compared.(n22)  
Contributory negligence emerged as a complete defense in England in 1809(n23) and in the 
United States in 1824.(n24) The principles of damages apportionment, however, were applied 
much earlier. Legal historians trace the roots of comparative negligence to the Digest of 
Justinian, a work that sought to summarize Roman law up to 533 A.D.,(n25) but one scholar 
Credits the medieval sea codes for the introduction of comparative negligence into the codes of 
civil law jurisdictions(n26) where it became well established long before its acceptance in this 
country.(n27) In England, admiralty law provided for equal division of damages until 1911, and 
that was the rule in the United States until 1975 when the Supreme Court adopted the concept of 
apportionment based on fault.(n28) By 1953, the United States was virtually the last stronghold 
of contributory negligence.(n29)  
Prosser and Keeton find a host of explanations in the authorities for the persistence of 
contributory negligence as a complete defense in the United States.(n30) Given that any degree 
of contribution by the plaintiff to his own injury barred him from any recovery, juries found it 
difficult to find for plaintiffs under this rule. In common accident situations, such as railroad 
crossing collisions, where some failure on the part of the injured party to exercise due care could 
be presumed, courts frequently took cases against railroads and other industries away from 
increasingly plaintiff-oriented juries to decide them for the defendants as matters of law.(n31) 
Ultimately, courts began to recognize the one-sidedhess of this regime, and limitations on the 
defense arose, such as the "last clear chance" doctrine, that softened its harshness in certain 
situations.(n32)  
At least two states experimented with comparative principles in the nineteenth century. Illinois 
adopted judicially for a period of time the concept that a slightly at fault plaintiff could recover 
from a grossly at fault defendant, but no provision was made for apportionment of 
damages.(n33) In Georgia, an 1860 statute provided for diminution of a negligent plaintiffs 
damages in railroad cases.(n34) In 1913, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Elk Cotton Mills v. 
Grant,(n35) combined this railroad statute with another one of general applicability, which 
provided that "the defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have 
contributed to the injury sustained," thus creating through statutory construction a comparative 
negligence system for the state.(n36) The court relied on a 1904 case,(n37) which held that, in 
order to recover, the plaintiffs negligence must be less than the defendant's.(n38) Thus, Georgia's 
was the first modified comparative negligence system in the United States.  
Five years earlier, Congress had enacted the second Federal Employers' Liability Act(n39) 
(FELA), a "pure" form of comparative negligence to cover interstate railroad employees.(n40) 
Coverage for intrastate railroad workers was later enacted by thirty states.(n41) The first 
comparative negligence statute of general applicability was enacted by Mississippi in 1910.(n42) 
It also provided for the pure form, emulating the FELA.(n43) In 1931, Wisconsin enacted a 
general comparative negligence statute based on the FELA and its own intrastate railroad 
workers statute.(n44) This latter statute contained a fifty percent recovery bar, which became 
part of the 1931 law.(n45) Wisconsin is generally credited with developing and refining the 
modified form of comparative negligence.(n46)  
Nebraska in 1913, and South Dakota in 1941, enacted slight/gross systems, but this approach 
failed to attract a following.(n47) Tennessee, in 1907, judicially adopted a provision permitting a 
plaintiff whose contributory negligence was "remote" to recover, but that concept has since been 
supplanted there by a modified, fifty-percent-recovery-bar system.(n48) Until the late 1960s, 
only one other state, Arkansas, enacted a comparative negligence law,(n49) despite numerous 
attempts to pass such legislation.(n50)  
In the 1960s the fault system in the United States came under attack in two major areas: state 
courts began to apply strict liability principles in defective product cases,(n51) and a number of 
influential commentators began to promote the concept of no-fault automobile insurance 
laws.(n52) Professor Schwartz attributes the ensuing rush of state legislatures to enact 
comparative fault legislation from 1965 through 1973 to "a desire to save the fault system."(n53) 
Business and liability insurance interests certainly preferred the hitherto unpalatable 
apportionment of fault concept to the more radical no-fault proposals.(n54)  
The first state court of last resort to adopt judicially a general comparative negligence system 
was Florida's in 1973. In Hoffman v. Jones,(n55) the Florida Supreme Court chose the pure form 
as did the majority of courts that followed Florida's example of judicial adoption.(n56) Today, 
twelve states maintain the pure form of comparative fault;(n57) thirty-three have modified 
systems;(n58) one state, South Dakota, still retains the slight/gross system;(n59) and four states, 
all in the southeast, retain contributory negligence as a complete defense.(n60)  
Because comparative fault represented a compromise between the defensive regimes of 
contributory negligence and no-fault, it is not surprising that many state legislatures opted for the 
modified form. As we will demonstrate, modified comparative fault imposes a significantly 
smaller burden on defendants than does the pure form.(n61) Although the economic argument 
for modification is realistic, this system, like that of contributory negligence, permits defendants 
whose wrongful conduct proximately caused injury to escape liability entirely.(n62)  
At the same time, however, a measure of flexibility is provided by leaving it to the jury to 
determine whether the percentage bar for the plaintiffs recovery has been reached. Although 
making this determination is an exercise in physical fact-finding, it is more than that the task 
requires a moral weighing of relative culpability.(n63) Additional flexibility is provided by 
permitting the jury to determine the total amount of damages, an amount it can reduce if it 
believes it has stretched to find the plaintiffs percentage of fault below the jurisdiction's 
percentage bar.(n64) Although the modified comparative fault jury may have these fine-tuning 
tools at its disposal, the question arises whether the jury should be made aware of how it might 
exercise this power.(n65) The issue of whether to disclose to the jury the existence of a 
percentage bar can be effectively examined by considering how four state jurisdictions have 
resolved the disclosure question.  
BLINDFOLD V. SUNSHINE IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS  
The Origin of Blindfolding -- Wisconsin  
The rule against disclosing to civil juries the existence of a percentage bar to recovery emerged 
in Wisconsin as a corollary to that state's strong preference for special verdict practice in civil 
cases.(n66) The purpose of special verdicts is to divide more clearly the functions of judge and 
jury.(n67) The special verdict charge requires the jury to submit in writing answers to a series of 
factual questions.(n68) What is not asked of the special verdict jury is to determine the ultimate 
outcome of the litigation. That task is assigned to the court, which is to fashion an ultimate-
outcome judgment consistent with the special verdict answers and the applicable state law.(n69)  
To secure bias-free answers to special verdict questions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 1890, 
ruled that the jury "must not consider the effect which their answers may have... upon the 
controversy or the parties."(n70) This was long before comparative negligence was enacted by 
any state.(n71) In 1907, the court ruled that when special verdicts are used, it would constitute 
"reversible error for the trial court by instruction.., to inform the jury expressly or by necessary 
implication of the effect of [a special verdict answer] upon the ultimate right of either party 
litigant to recover or upon the ultimate liability of either party litigant."(n72) Thus, when the 
Wisconsin legislature enacted comparative negligence in 1931,(n73) the blindfold rule was 
already in place for cases in which special verdicts were used. This was almost always because 
special verdicts were--and still are--deemed "to be the rule and not the exception" in 
Wisconsin.(n74) In 1940, the supreme court tightened the blindfold further by holding that 
"counsel was also precluded from arguing the effect of its answers to the jury."(n75)  
The Wisconsin model of modified comparative fault with special verdicts, fifty percent recovery 
bar, and blindfold was followed by the nine states adopting comparative negligence up to the 
1970s.(n76) Blindfolding was the clear majority rule at that time.(n77)  
The blindfold rule proved to be troublesome in practice. Juries were not easily dissuaded from 
seeking to produce desired ultimate outcomes with the answers to their special verdict 
questions.(n78) As judges strove mightily to keep them in the dark with respect to legal 
consequences, jurors persisted in attempting to infer what those consequences were likely to be. 
Prior to enactment of modified comparative fault they often inferred correctly, based on their 
prior knowledge, common sense, and hints derived from how the evidence was being presented 
and argued by counsel. To avoid reversal in these cases, courts in Wisconsin and other states 
were compelled to promulgate "common knowledge" exception rules.(n79) Similarly, a 
"conditional question" exception became necessary to deal with series of special verdict 
questions that had the effect of tipping off juries as to what effect their yes or no answers might 
have on the ultimate outcome.(n80)  
More troublesome were the cases presented to juries after modified comparative fault was 
enacted. Now it became less likely that jurors would infer correctly the existence and operation 
of the percentage bar.(n81) In states with a fifty percent bar, uninformed juries frequently elected 
to split the responsibility evenly between plaintiff and defendant, an attractive proposition for 
juries that found it difficult to assign percentages of fault with scientific precision.(n82) Because 
this scenario operated systematically against plaintiffs, Wisconsin raised its percentage bar from 
fifty to fifty-one percent, but it retained the blindfold rule.(n83)  
Other states dealt with these problems by giving trial judges considerable discretion whether or 
not to blindfold in individual cases.(n84) Others concluded that the blindfold concept represented 
a failed experiment and had to go.(n85)  
The Blindfold Rule is Rejected -- Colorado  
Colorado was one of the nine early adopters of the Wisconsin model of modified comparative 
fault.(n86) But in 1974, in a Colorado appellate decision, the court rejected the Wisconsin 
approach, calling instead for a mandated sunshine rule. In Simpson v. Anderson,(n87) the court 
applied a rule that recognized that "jurors collectively represent a cross-section of the conscience 
of the community."(n88) Jurors should be trusted and courts must recognize that, realistically, 
"juries will anticipate the consequences of their findings relative to the percentage of 
negligence."(n89) If so, it is "preferable for the jury to deliberate with an understanding of the 
true effect of the law rather than under misapprehensions."(n90) Recognizing that the manner in 
which the law applies "will ultimately become known to at least some members of the 
community who will be asked to sit upon juries,"(n91) it is "far better for courts to be the vehicle 
by which the law is explained."(n92) Simpson was the first appellate decision in the country to 
reject the blindfold rule on the percentage of negligence issue.(n93)  
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed Simpson.(n94) In a companion case the supreme court 
opined that the Colorado legislature had "intended to establish a system in negligence cases 
which divides the responsibility between judge and jury. Such a system enhances the chance of a 
pure verdict on material facts alone."(n95) Jury members need understand no law beyond that 
"which enables them to answer the specific questions asked of them on special verdict forms. 
Under this system, it is unnecessary for the jury to concern itself with how much the plaintiff 
receives."(n96)  
The two Colorado opinions succinctly set forth the doctrinal positions of the sunshine versus 
blindfold debate. The Colorado Court of Appeals argued that, whether or not juries are informed 
of legal consequences, it is in their nature to attempt to influence the ultimate outcome of the 
cases upon which they sit. Their findings are less likely to be distorted by mistaken legal 
conclusions if they understand where their findings may lead. The Colorado Supreme Court's 
position was that juries can be effectively limited to narrow fact-finding without regard to 
ultimate outcomes, and should be required to do so in accord with the legislative intent of the 
comparative fault statute. For Colorado the issue was resolved shortly thereafter: the legislature 
sided with the court of appeals by mandating a broad sunshine rule as to the existence of a 
percentage bar in comparative fault cases.(n97)  
There were no new adopters of the blindfold rule until 1995.(n98) Apparently, policy makers in 
the large majority of modified comparative fault states concluded that juries either can not or 
should not be dissuaded from trying to help fashion the ultimate outcome of their deliberations.  
The Sunshine Rule is Reinforced -- Wyoming  
Wyoming's first comparative fault statute was enacted in 1973.(n99) The language of section 1-
7.2 followed closely the Wisconsin law with its special verdict requirements?(n100) In 
Woodward v. Haney,(n101) the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that, when the legislature 
adopted Wisconsin's statutory language, it intended to adopt Wisconsin's judicial construction 
that held it would be reversible error to advise the jury, in argument or by instruction, of the 
effect of its verdict.(n102) One commentator, writing two years before Woodward was decided, 
had argued that the blindfold rule should not be binding on Wyoming because Wyoming's 
special verdict procedure differed from Wisconsin's in that Wyoming juries "can be told of the 
legal effect of all issues not put in special verdict form."(n103) Under Wyoming procedure only 
questions of damage apportionment and amount of damages were to be in special verdict form; 
all other issues could be argued to the jury as would be true if a general verdict were submitted. 
"This being the case, it is senseless to inform the jury about the effects of their unrecorded 
findings and at the same time conceal the applicable law on those findings which are recorded in 
special verdict form."(n104)  
The issue was resolved when, in 1976, the Wyoming State Legislature enacted section 1-7.7, 
which provided that the ad damnum clause in pleadings for damages shall not be construed to 
prevent argument to the court or jury concerning the amount of any party's claim; and that "the 
court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict."(n105) In Johnson v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc.,(n106) the Wyoming Supreme Court held that section 1-7.7 could not be harmonized 
with the Woodward court's plain meaning interpretation of section 1-7.1.(n107) In Johnson, 
section 17.7 was interpreted as a sunshine rule superseding by implication the blindfold rule of 1-
7.1.(n108)  
The Johnson court noted that the Colorado Legislature had amended its statute using language 
similar to that of section 1-7.7 and the Colorado Supreme Court had construed the provision as 
"imposing an independent duty upon the trial court to instruct the jury on the comparative-
negligence statute's effect" even though plaintiff's counsel did not request the jury be told.(n109) 
The Johnson court held that the same independent duty to inform would apply to Wyoming 
courts.(n110)  
In 1986, the comparative fault statute was amended. New section 11-109(b) retreated from the 
Johnson court's "independent duty" holding. The new section provided that the court was under a 
duty to "[i]nform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault" 
only if requested by any party.(n111) In 1994, the statute was amended once more. This time the 
Wyoming Legislature returned to the Johnson court's earlier holding: "The Court shall: (i) If a 
jury trial ...(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault."(n112)  
Why this reaffirmation of the trial court's independent duty to disclose? We suggested earlier that 
policy makers might reason that the blindfold rule favors defendants;(n113) perhaps Wyoming 
legislators were seeking to benefit plaintiffs by reinforcing the state's sunshine rule. Not very 
likely. A commentator characterized the 1994 amendments as follows: "Whatever the intent 
behind the new act it represents a significant victory for defendants, and a significant loss for 
plaintiffs...."(n114) Although Wyoming's 1994 comparative fault law can fairly be characterized 
as a tort reform statute, blindfolding civil juries on the percentage of negligence question was not 
part of it. We suspect that the Wyoming Legislature decided that there was insufficient evidence 
that blindfolding would benefit the Wyoming economy sufficient to overcome the anomalous 
and inconsistent verdicts often rendered by uninformed jurors. To make certain that the latter 
result was avoided, the Legislature mandated that all modified comparative fault juries in 
Wyoming will deliberate in sunshine.  
One Wyoming commentator discussed the potential economic impact of a sunshine rule as 
follows:  
Although considerable attention and litigation have been devoted to the issue of informing the 
jury, there is no empirical evidence on whether advising a jury of the consequences of its 
allocation of fault is beneficial to the plaintiff or the defendant(s). For now, at least, the issue in 
Wyoming is moot. The new Wyoming statute requires the court to instruct the jury as to the 
consequences of its decision.(n115)  
One jurisdiction decided not to wait for empirical evidence.  
The Reemergence of the Blindfold Rule -- Illinois  
Probably no state has had more experience with the various forms of comparative fault than 
Illinois.(n116) Over its history, Illinois has experimented with a "slight/gross" system;(n117) 
experienced a failed attempt by an appellate court to adopt judicially the Wisconsin model of 
modified comparative negligence;(n118) saw a successful but short-lived judicial adoption of 
pure comparative negligence;(n119) legislated a modified comparative fault system with a 
mandated sunshine rule;(n120) and, most recently, enacted a modified system with a mandated 
blindfold rule governing the percentage of negligence question.(n121)  
In 1858, the Illinois Supreme Court held, in Galena & Chicago Union Railroad v. Jacobs,(n122) 
that the "degree of negligence must be measured and considered and wherever it shall appear that 
the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be 
deprived of his action."(n123) Under this slight/gross system there was no damages 
apportionment; either plaintiffs recovered or they did not.(n124) Later cases permitted plaintiffs 
more than slightly at fault to recover so long as their negligence was greatly outweighed by that 
of defendants.(n125) The system persisted for three decades, near the end of which, cases were 
decided that ignored or limited the slight/gross defense.(n126) In Lanark v. Dougherty,(n127) the 
supreme court ended this experiment with comparative principles by reestablishing contributory 
negligence as a complete defense.(n128)  
In Illinois and elsewhere, growing dissatisfaction with the harshness of contributory negligence 
led to common law exceptions that mitigated its effects in specific situations.(n129) Although 
there was considerable interest in comparative fault principles as a potentially more equitable 
risk distribution mechanism during the first sixty years of the twentieth century,(n130) only the 
Congress and a few state legislatures were able to enact statutes.(n131) Despite a number of 
attempts the Illinois legislature failed to produce a law.(n132) But as the fault system came under 
attack in the 1960s, the hitherto effective resistance of the insurance industry to comparative 
principles diminished.(n133) The legislative logjam in some states gave way,(n134) and in 
others, the courts led the way by judicial adoption of comparative fault.(n135) Their reasoning 
was that, since contributory negligence was a common law defense, courts had the power and 
duty to replace it with a more equitable rule.(n136) When the Florida Supreme Court judicially 
adopted comparative fault in 1973,(n137) it was followed by several other high courts including 
the influential California Supreme Court.(n138)  
Six years prior to Florida's ground breaking adoption, an Illinois Court of Appeals, in Maki v. 
Frelk,(n139) attempted to apply the Wisconsin model to that case.(n140) Maki was reversed 
despite favorable commentary in academic circles.(n141) The supreme court rejected the notion 
of judicial adoption, insisting that such a change required legislation.(n142) When in the next 
thirteen years there still was no statute, the supreme court, in Alvis v. Ribar,(n143) followed the 
Florida precedent by judicially adopting the pure form of comparative fault.(n144) In response to 
criticisms that judicial adoption generally fails to address detailed issues, the court stated: "We 
believe that the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories will serve as a guide to assist 
the jury in its deliberations. We leave the resolution of other collateral issues to future 
cases."(n145) With respect to the collateral issue of whether to blindfold juries on the percentage 
of negligence question, the issue concerning us in this article did not arise, because under the 
pure system, there is no percentage bar about which the jury need be informed.  
The Illinois General Assembly finally enacted a modified comparative fault statute in 
1986.(n146) The section on jury instructions provided for a mandated sunshine rule: "The court 
shall instruct the jury in writing that the defendant shall be found not liable if the jury finds that 
the contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage for which recovery is sought."(n147) As with the other three states we have examined, 
there is no evidence that the Illinois General Assembly ever considered economic impact when it 
chose its rule governing disclosure to the jury. Rather, the law makers appear to have decided 
this issue based on how they believed jurors would behave under both rules, choosing the one 
they believed would enable jurors best to discharge their obligation to find facts based solely on 
the evidence.  
In the 1994 elections, however, American voters signaled their disenchantment with excessive 
governmental intrusion into the private sector. A call for legislation lifting the burden of tort 
litigation was presented by conservative politicians to the voters as an essential element of that 
agenda.(n148) In a number of states the votes for substantial "tort reform" were available.  
Probably, the most far-reaching bill to be enacted was that of Illinois.(n149) In a published 
statement, an Illinois Senate sponsor of the legislation made clear that the Act's objectives were 
to reduce the costs of liability and litigation for municipalities, small businesses, farmers, not-
for-profit organizations, doctors, hospitals, manufacturers, and taxpayers generally.(n150) The 
statement decried the "emotionalism" so often invoked on behalf of plaintiffs; readers were urged 
to consider that "[t]he public debate over tort reform has largely ignored the costs of being a 
defendant."(n151)  
The 1986 section in the Civil Code on "jury instructions in tort action"(n152) was apparently one 
of many provisions deemed ripe for reform. The mandated sunshine rule on percentage of 
negligence was replaced with a mandated blindfold: "[T]he court shall not inform or instruct the 
jury that defendant shall be found not liable if the jury finds that the contributory fault of the 
plaintiff is more than 50%."(n153) This about-face by the Illinois General Assembly was the first 
time since the 1970s that a jurisdiction has imposed a blindfold rule with respect to the existence 
of a percentage bar to the plaintiff's recovery.(n154)  
The new section on jury instructions was not entirely a jury blindfold. To underscore that the 
objective of this section was to achieve an economic result, rather than to protect the integrity of 
special verdicts or maintain the appropriate roles of judge and jury, the section requires the judge 
to "inform the jury" that any award of compensatory or punitive damages will not be 
taxable.(n155) One commentary predicted that the "overwhelming effect of this change will be 
to reduce awards."(n156) As for the percentage bar blindfold, these commentators observed that 
"[i]t must be surmised that the reason behind the change is that a sympathetic jury would be less 
willing to find a plaintiff more than 50 percent at fault and would manipulate the percentage of 
fault were it told the law."(n157)  
To determine whether juries in the aggregate will in fact manipulate the percentage of fault (and 
the amount of damages), the authors have designed and performed the experiment described in 
the next part of this article.  
COMPARING BLINDFOLDED MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT VERDICTS WITH 
SUNSHINE VERDICTS: AN EMPIRICAL LABORATORY EXPERIMENT  
Overview  
The authors concluded that field research into the economic effects of blindfold and sunshine 
jury instructions was not feasible. Actual cases differ too much on their facts, on the quality of 
physical evidence, the personalities and abilities of attorneys, and the appeal and credibility of 
witnesses. On the other hand the question appeared researchable using laboratory methods of 
social psychology.(n158)  
The authors scripted, produced, and videotaped two versions of a simulated, personal injury trial 
conducted under modified comparative fault rules.(n159) In the Baseline (Base) version the 
judge instructs the jury under a blindfold rule; in the Variant, the jury receives a sunshine 
instruction.  
Groups of mock juror subjects were recruited to view each of the versions. After viewing the 
trial tape and receiving instructions, the groups were randomly assigned to six or seven person 
juries.(n160) The juries retired to separate rooms and deliberated for up to two hours, rendering 
verdicts on forms also calling for answers to special interrogatories.(n161) The interrogatories 
asked for the total amount of damages without regard to any contributory negligence; the 
percentage of negligence attributable to each of three parties (two defendants and the plaintiff); 
and the amount of damages attributable to each party to be calculated by the jury's multiplying 
each party's percentage of fault by the total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. The sum 
of the percentages of fault for the three parties had to equal 100%.  
Following each jury's deliberations, each juror filled out an exit survey which included 
statements to which the individual jurors indicated levels of agreement on a five point scale 
ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). The survey asked an additional seven 
demographic questions, and several open-ended questions about factors influencing the juror's 
personal decision and that of his jury panel.  
The verdict data from the Base and Variant juries were tabulated and analyzed. Descriptive 
statistics (means, medians, and standard deviations) were calculated and those of the two 
versions were compared. Statistical tests were performed to determine whether the differences 
between the Base and Variant measures of central tendency were significant.  
The Simulated Trial Scenario  
To ensure realism, the authors felt it important to use testimony and physical evidence from an 
actual trial. In addition, an actual case provides a real-world benchmark verdict with which the 
experimental verdicts can be compared. We sought a modified comparative fault case that turned 
primarily on issues of fact rather than law; one in which credible evidence could be adduced at 
trial upon which reasonable jurors could differ as to whether the plaintiff was more or less than 
51% at fault; and one in which there were multiple defendants so that the option of shifting fault 
among the defendants by the jury could be studied. We required a negligence case that lawyers 
and lay persons would likely agree was typical, and because this was a simulation, we felt it 
important that the personal injury be grave to ensure that the subject jurors would take the 
exercise seriously. After a lengthy search, we selected for our model an Indiana motor vehicle 
accident case which met all these requirements.(n162) We captioned the simulation: McKey v. 
Torino Pizza Co. Inc.  
With respect to the facts of McKey v. Torino Pizza, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in discussing 
the underlying case upon which McKey was based, said: "Nearly every fact related to the 
accident is vigorously disputed." What is undisputed in the simulation is that about 7:00 A.M. on 
an early November day in rural southern Indiana, Dawn McKey, a sixteen year old attractive and 
popular cheerleader on her way to school, pulled out from a county road onto the preferred state 
road on which a truck called a "stepvan," driven by an employee of Torino Pizza Co., was 
approaching. In both the Base and Variant versions Torino Pizza is represented to the juries as "a 
large national manufacturer of food products." As a result of the ensuing collision, Dawn 
suffered massive brain injuries, which left her with no memory of the accident and virtually no 
subsequent ability to remember events from day to day. The only other accident witness was the 
truck driver, Will Drummond, who incurred superficial injuries that were not at issue in the 
case.(n163)  
The intersection of County Road 1040 and State Road 38 is in a valley between two low hills. 
Because the hills' sightlines in both directions were restricted for Dawn, her making a left turn 
onto S.R. 38 was fraught with danger. The State of Indiana had placed a 40 M.P.H. "advisory-
speed" sign below the crest of the hill over which Will Drummond had just come, but the speed 
limit along S.R. 38 was 55 M.P.H. throughout the area. Advisory speed signs in Indiana are 
treated like other warning signs such as "yield" or "deer crossing." The statute requires drivers to 
take action in adherence to these warnings only when conditions indicate there is reason to do so. 
The parties hotly disputed the speed of the stepvan at the moment of collision, and vigorously 
argued whether conditions existed requiring the stepvan to slow down to 40 M.P.H. The plaintiff 
claimed Torino Pizza, through its driver, was negligent because he had approached the 
intersection at an unreasonable speed; he had failed to abide by warning signs; he was unable to 
control his vehicle to avoid the accident; and had failed to maintain a proper lookout.  
The State of Indiana was also a defendant on the plaintiffs theory that it was well known that the 
intersection was highly dangerous, this notice creating a duty for the State to do more than it had 
done to protect drivers attempting to make left turns onto the state road The State does not 
appear at trial, however, because, unbeknownst to the jury, the plaintiff and the State had entered 
into a "covenant not to execute."(n164) Despite hearing no defense from it, the jury was 
permitted to allocate a percentage of fault to the State.  
The trial simulation breaks down into 14 segments:  
1. Plaintiffs Opening Statement: The plaintiff's attorney tells the jury about Dawn, her 
family, her aspirations, her injuries, suffering, and what she has lost as a result of the 
accident. He describes the plaintiffs theory of the case and gives reasons why the jury 
should allocate fault to the defendants. He treats the State's liability lightly;(n165) the 
dangerousness of the intersection he raises primarily to show that Torino's agent, Will 
Drummond, had notice of it and failed to take it into account.  
2. Defendant's Opening Statement: Torino's attorney admonishes the jury not to let 
sympathy for Dawn affect their consideration of the liability issues. He tells jurors that 
Dawn should have been instructed by her parents to take a longer but less dangerous 
route to school that morning. He asks them to accept that Will Drummond had no reason 
to go on high alert at the intersection, that his driving behavior was reasonable, and that 
his speed approaching Dawn's car could not really be ascertained, even by Will. He asks 
them to attribute 100% of the fault to Dawn and the State. Finally, he promises the jury 
evidence that Dawn is not injured as severely as the plaintiff makes out.  
3. Testimony of Carter Stumpf: The Lincoln County Sheriffs Captain is shown photographs 
of the road and the 40 M.P.H. advisory sign. He testifies to the well-known 
dangerousness of the intersection. He is shown color photographs of the wreckage with 
which he describes the scene at the site shortly after the accident. His accident report 
which reports dry pavement, daylight, and Dawn's failure to yield the right of way is put 
in evidence. He testifies there were no skid marks prior to collision suggesting that, 
because the truck driver was inattentive, he failed to brake.  
4. Testimony of Will Drummond: Truck driver Drummond testifies about his experience 
driving grain trucks; the nature of his job as a delivery/route salesman for Torino; his 
suspension for tardy paper work; his return to work the day of the accident; and Dawn's 
pullout that day leaving him no opportunity to take evasive action. When asked about the 
40 M.P.H. advisory and school bus signs, he testifies that he does not remember them 
being there. He claims he was not distracted by his suspension. He concedes that he was 
doing 55 to the crest of the hill and believes he had "eased off" the accelerator on the way 
down, but he can not remember his approach speed. (In an earlier deposition, he had 
stated he was going about 50 M.P.H. down the hill.) He testifies for the first time that 
Dawn stopped at the stop sign located 26 feet from the state road, then came on out 
without stopping again from that position. He maintains that he did brake before the 
collision.  
5. Testimony of Vincent Schneider: Plaintiff's expert accident reconstructionist testifies that 
the distance the vehicles travelled after the collision on a dry pavement indicates an 
impact speed of 50 M.P.H. He introduces an animated computer simulation of the 
accident demonstrating graphically that, if Drummond had obeyed the advisory speed 
sign, there would have been a clean miss of 62 feet. His animation assumes Dawn 
stopped for the first and last time at the edge of the state road, not at the stop sign. He 
assigns 100% of the fault of the accident to Torino (Drummond).  
6. Testimony of Neil Sundstrom: Plaintiffs expert authority on truck-driving safety testifies 
that Drummond's safety training was woefully deficient, but no training requirement laws 
were violated by Torino. He testifies that a trained driver would have immediately slowed 
and covered his brakes as soon as he saw the conflicting traffic (Dawn's car) moving 
toward the state road from the stop sign. He accepts Drummond's testimony and assumes 
she stopped there.  
7. Testimony of Penney McKey: Mother of the plaintiff testifies as to the horrendous 
burdens the family has suffered because of Dawn's slow and painful physical 
rehabilitation and her permanent mental impairments, seizures, and anti-social 
personality disorders.  
8. Testimony of Carla Trammell: Plaintiff's expert clinical neuropsychologist summarizes 
Dawn's post-accident medical history, and describes her current and permanent loss of 
mental function. Trammell also operates Indiana's only rehabilitation facility for these 
types of injury. She testifies as to the costs of a rehabilitation program for Dawn.  
9. Testimony of Arnold Eagleton: Plaintiffs expert economist projects Dawn's high and low 
range of economic damages for lost income (based on her probable work-life expectancy) 
and for the costs she will incur for lifetime residential care (based on her full life 
expectancy). To these he adds medical and rehabilitation costs. Following Eagleton's 
testimony, the plaintiff rests  
10. Testimony of Stanton Kramer: Defendant's expert accident reconstructionist testifies that 
his "momentum analysis" of the physical evidence yields an impact speed of 30-35 
M.P.H. He opines that there was no time, even at that speed, for Drummond to react. He 
testifies that only a very cautious driver would have reacted to Dawn's moving from the 
stop sign. Following Kramer's testimony, the defense rests.  
11. Plaintiffs First Closing Argument: Plaintiff's attorney reviews his theory of the case and 
how the plaintiff witnesses' testimony supports it. He admits some fault on Dawn's part, 
but argues that Torino and the State were more responsible. With respect to damages, 
plaintiff's attorney recapitulates the figures of the economist. He adds a range of non-
economic damages (pain and suffering) based on $2-$4 an hour, which Dawn will incur 
over her life expectancy.  
12. Defendant's Closing Argument: Attorney again urges the jury not to be swayed by 
sympathy. He attacks the plaintiff's accident reconstruction, which assumed that Dawn 
stopped once at the edge of the state road. He emphasizes Drummond's good driving 
record and argues that Will had no reason to be rushed or distracted by his job or his 
suspension. He focuses the jury's attention on Dawn's failure to look left again before she 
turned left. He emphasizes that State Road 38 is a preferred road to County Road 1040. 
He misrepresents the amount of miss shown on the animated simulation as two rather 
than sixty-two feet. He attacks the assumptions of the plaintiff's damages testimony, 
suggesting that Dawn might not have been headed for college, nor is she certain to be 
unemployable, or need lifetime residential care.  
13. Plaintiffs Final Closing Argument: In this rebuttal argument, plaintiff's attorney explains 
to the jury that the assumptions about Dawn's stopping point do not affect Dawn's case; 
either assumption leads to a "clean miss" if Drummond had just slowed down or braked. 
He denies defense attorney's two-foot-miss assertion. He emphasizes that, despite having 
the right of way, a driver on the preferred road is negligent if he fails to react to 
conflicting traffic moving from a dead stop in the direction of the state road. He derides 
Torino's failure to call experts to rebut plaintiff's damages experts, and demands that the 
jury accept plaintiff's uncontested evidence. He attacks the big company mentality that 
denies having made mistakes when they cost the company money. He concludes with an 
emotional description of Dawn's loss.  
14. Jury Instructions: Judge Barton reads aloud 22 instructions taken from the underlying 
case, copies of which each juror has been given. They are to read the instructions silently 
along with the judge and are to bring them into the deliberation rooms. Several 
instructions, taken from Indiana Pattern Instructions, define "comparative fault," 
"negligence," "agent of the defendant," "preponderance of the evidence," "burden of 
proof," "proximate cause," "ordinary care," and "sole proximate cause." The judge reads 
the relevant Indiana statutes, and sets out the various common law duties. He instructs the 
jury how both are to be applied. He lists possible items of damages and informs the jury. 
that Dawn's life expectancy is 63.7 years. He explains the nature of expert opinion and 
tells the jury it must render an unanimous verdict.  
The trial of the underlying case took thirteen days and generated 4,000 pages of trial transcript. 
The McKey simulation runs about four hours. The number of witnesses was reduced, rebuttal 
evidence was incorporated into direct and cross-examination, long medical depositions were 
summarized and integrated into one witness's testimony, and all motions, objections, and 
sidebars were deleted. Despite the simplification and compression, we believe that all significant 
factual issues were preserved.  
Subjects  
Mock juror subjects were 489 undergraduate students recruited on seven college campuses in 
Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington state. The large majority of the 
students were sophomores or juniors either enrolled or expected to enroll in their institutions' 
business programs. They had volunteered for the McKey exercise in conjunction with their 
introductory business law course. At this point they had either minimal or no exposure to 
comparative fault principles.  
The pool of jurors was about equally split across genders (51% male, 49% female). The average 
age was 22.7 years,(n166) ranging from seventeen to fifty-seven.(n167) Racially, 81% of the 
jurors were white. Among the minorities were Asian (7%); African-American (4%); and 
Hispanic (4%).  
On each campus, groups ranging from twelve to ninety-six viewed either the Base or Variant 
trial simulation. In most cases, the exercise was administered on evenings or weekends as an 
extra credit project for which the students received extra credit points. In two instances the 
exercise was run as a regular classroom exercise for regular credit. After viewing their versions, 
the students were randomly assigned to jury panels to deliberate and render comparative fault 
verdicts. All iterations took place during the period from July 2, 1996 to January 22, 1997.  
Manipulating the Independent Variable: "Lifting the Blindfold"  
The Base version of McKey is conducted as if the jurisdiction (Indiana) maintains a system of 
pure comparative fault. INSTRUCTION No. 1 instructs the jury to find the percentages of fault 
attributable to each party, to find the total damages, and to multiply the percentages for each 
defendant by the total damages to determine the award due the plaintiff. The verdict form 
conforms to this instruction. No reference is made by either attorney to the fifty-one percent bar 
to recovery.  
In the Variant version, INSTRUCTION NO. I instructs the jury to find the percentages of fault 
attributable to each party, and, if more than 50% is found attributable to the plaintiff, "no further 
deliberations are required."(n168) This instruction conforms to Indiana law and was given in the 
underlying case. In the McKey simulation, however, the Variant juries also receive a SPECIAL 
INSTRUCTION NO. I that instructs them that, notwithstanding the instruction to cease 
deliberating upon finding the plaintiff 51% or more at fault, they are "specially instructed to 
continue [their deliberations] in each instance until [they] have agreed on a percentage of fault 
for all three parties." The purpose of the SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO.1 is to obtain all the 
Variant percentages to compare with those of the Base juries.  
In the Variant, the plaintiffs lawyer in his first closing argument states:  
So, in considering all of those causes, if you find that the fault of Dawn in proximately causing 
this accident was more than 50%, then she loses. If you find, however, that her fault was 50% or 
less, and the combined fault of Torino and the state of Indiana more than 50%, then she is 
entitled to damages. That is the Indiana law concerning responsibility and liability.(n169)  
In his final closing argument, the plaintiffs attorney states: "[Judge Barton] will instruct you to 
compare the duties of the parties to determine their shares of the fault involved. And if you find 
that Dawn McKey's fault was less than 51%, then you move to the question of damages."(n170)  
INSTRUCTION NO. 1, SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 1, and the closing argument references 
to the percentage bar are the tools with which the sole independent variable in the McKey 
exercise is manipulated: In the Base version, jurors are blindfolded; in the Variant, the blindfold 
is lifted. Dependent Variables (DV); Hypotheses (H); and Experimental Results (ER) Based on 
the Verdict Data  
In the experimental framework that has been described, the subject jurors can react through the 
group behavior of their jury panels--to the manipulation of the independent variable in five ways: 
1) They can choose not to reach an apportionment verdict, in which case their panels will be 
deemed to be "hung";(n171) 2) they can change the percentage of fault they attribute to one of 
the defendants; 3) they can change the percentage of fault they attribute to both defendants, 
which, since total fault must add up to 100% implies an inverse change in the percentage of fault 
attributed to the plaintiff, Dawn McKey; 4) they can change the amount of damages awarded to 
Dawn; 5) they can decide that no changes in percentages of fault or amount of damages are 
indicated.  
With respect to option 5, we should point out that the application of a blindfold or sunshine rule 
is likely to have a significant effect only in cases where the plaintiff's fault is arguably at or near 
the 50% level. When the plaintiffs fault is demonstrably either slight or gross, juries will be less 
likely to be motivated by their knowledge of a percentage bar; their findings under either rule are 
likely to be similar. Policy makers who see the adoption of the blindfold rule as a tort reform 
issue affecting their jurisdictions' business climates should consider that many, if not most, 
modified comparative fault cases will be unaffected by a blindfold or sunshine rule. The McKey 
case, however, is one of those cases where reasonable jurors can find the plaintiff either more or 
less than 51% at fault.(n172) These are the cases most likely to go to a jury. on liability issues, 
and the ones most likely to have a precedential effect.  
To study how juries generally are likely to react to this manipulation, we presented the Base 
(blindfold rule) version of the McKey trial to one sample of 39 jury panels and the Variant 
(sunshine rule) version to another sample of 45 panels.(n173) Indiana is a state in which the fault 
of the plaintiff is compared with the combined fault of all defendants taken as a unit.(n174) Also, 
Indiana is a state that permits recovery when the plaintiff and defendants are equally at 
fault.(n175) The McKey case is tried under these rules.  
The verdict data are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Table 1 presents the "raw" data from the 
Base juries, i.e., before the court adjusts the verdicts to conform to Indiana's fifty-one percent 
recovery bar. Table 2 presents the same data after the court has adjusted the Base verdicts to 
reflect $0.00 of damages in those instances where the jury found Dawn more than 50% at fault. 
Table 3 presents the data from the Variant verdicts. These require no adjustment by the court 
because the jury knows that a finding of 51% or more fault for Dawn means no damages for her 
and no liability for either defendant; under Indiana procedure the jury makes its own adjustments 
and renders an ultimate-outcome general verdict. Means, medians, and standard deviations for 
the data are indicated.  
Differences in the following six dependent variables were correlated with the manipulation of the 
independent variable.  
DV1: The mean percentage of fault attributable to both defendants combined.  
DV2: The mean percentage of fault attributable to the corporate defendant, Torino Pizza 
Company.  
DV3: The mean percentage of fault attributable to the State of Indiana.  
DV4: The mean percentage of fault attributable to Dawn by those juries in the samples who did 
not produce an ultimate award for Dawn.  
DV5: The frequency of the plaintiff's recovery.  
DV6: The mean dollar recovery of the plaintiff from all juries in the samples.  
The authors developed the following hypotheses predicting how the dependent variables will 
respond to the lifting of the jury's blindfold. We give our rationales for making these predictions, 
and we report the actual variations from the experimental verdict data.  
H1: The mean percentage of fault attributed by the blindfold juries to both defendants combined 
will be less than that attributed by the sunshine juries.  
Rationale: If knowledgeable juries under a sunshine rule are motivated by sympathy for a badly 
injured plaintiff, or by dissatisfaction with the concept of modified comparative fault, and they 
should wish to provide Dawn with an ultimate award, they can increase the percentage of fault 
attributable to the defendants so that Dawn's fault will be proportionately lowered.  
ER1: The blindfold juries found the defendants to be 34.4% (mean) at fault;(n176) the sunshine 
juries 44.0% at fault.(n177) A t-test difference of means was applied to the data.(n178) The 
observed t-value was 2.26 (d.f.=80) and the observed p-value was .013. The t-test difference of 
means strongly supports the assertion that the Variant sunshine juries allocated considerably 
more fault to the defendants than did the Base blindfold juries.  
H2: The mean percentage of fault attributed to Torino Pizza by the sunshine juries will be greater 
than that attributed by the blindfold juries.  
Rationale: If sympathy and dissatisfaction with modified comparative fault are present, those 
attitudes should be manifested by the juries' attributing a higher percentage of fault to the 
corporate defendant.  
ER2: The mean percentage of fault for Torino rendered by the blindfold sample was 
16.3%;(n179) by the sunshine sample, 29.3%.(n180) H2 is supported by the data, based on the t-
test difference of means. The observed t-value was 3.53 (d.f.=80), p-value .0003. The sunshine 
juries attributed nearly twice the fault to Torino than that attributed by the blindfold juries.  
H3: The mean percentage of fault attributed to the State by the sunshine juries will be higher 
than that attributed by those in the blindfold sample.  
Rationale: If sympathy and dissatisfaction are present, the sunshine juries, on average, will 
register a higher percentage of fault for both defendants to manifest their negative reaction to the 
percentage bar. To effectively lower Dawn's percentage of fault, jurors are likely to raise the 
percentages of fault attributable to both Torino and the State.  
ER3: The blindfold juries attributed 18.1% of fault to the State,(n181) the sunshine juries 
attributed 14.7%.(n182) H3 is not supported by the data. The percentages of the State's fault are 
essentially the same for both samples, based on the t-test difference of means: t-value 1.09 (d.f. 
80), p-value=.14. There is a significant probability that the observed difference, 18.1% versus 
14%, is due to chance, rather than a true difference between the populations. We think there is a 
reasonable explanation for why the sunshine juries did not apportion more fault to the State than 
did the blindfold juries. Those sunshine juries who may have been motivated by sympathy and 
dissatisfaction would be expected to examine -- or perhaps reexamine -- the evidence in the 
manner suggested by the plaintiffs attorney. In McKey, the plaintiff's attorney focused almost 
entirely on the allegedly negligent driving of Totino's truck driver, and Torino's attack on the 
State was also perfunctory.(n183)  
H4: The mean percentage of fault attributed to Dawn by those blindfold juries that did not 
produce an ultimate award for her will be greater than the mean percentage attributed to her by 
those sunshine juries that did not produce an ultimate award for her. Rationale: The proposition 
we are examining here is that the majority of sunshine juries that concluded that Dawn's 
negligence must bar her from recovery under modified comparative fault principles will 
nevertheless manifest tensions within their jury panels by registering lower percentages of fault 
for the plaintiff than their blindfolded counterparts.  
ER4: Consider Tables 4 and 5. The blindfolded juries that produced no ultimate award for Dawn 
found her to be 78.5% at fault;(n184) the sunshine juries under the same condition found her to 
be 65.9% at fault.(n185) H4 is supported by the data, based upon the t-test difference of means 
(t=3.73, d.f.=80, p=.0002). This result also suggests that, while sunshine juries might wish to 
compensate a more-at-fault-plaintiff, their oath to find facts objectively remains a powerful 
constraint on the ultimate outcome of their verdicts. Further evidence that a significant number 
of jurors and panels were influenced by knowledge of the 51% percentage bar is found in the 
answers to two "manipulation check" items from the Variant sunshine exit survey. Of the 247 
Variant jurors, 37.6% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: "Because I knew that 
assigning more than 50% of the fault to Dawn would bar her from receiving any damages, I was 
influenced to allocate an increased percentage of fault to one or both defendants."(n186) Of these 
same jurors 37.3% reported their jury panels were so influenced.(n187)  
H5: The plaintiff will recover more often under a sunshine rule than under a blindfold rule.  
Rationale: Sympathy and dissatisfaction, if present, are likely to be manifested by more of the 
knowledgeable sunshine juries finding Dawn 50% or less at fault than blindfolded juries who are 
ignorant of the percentage bar.  
ER5: Of the blindfold juries 30.1% found Dawn less than 51% at fault;(n188) 40% percent of the 
sunshine juries did so.(n189) We applied the z-test "difference of proportions"(n190) to the data. 
Based upon the observed z-value (.85) and the corresponding p-value (.197), we can conclude 
the difference in the observed proportions (30.1% v. 40%) is sufficiently large to consider the 
populations of interest -- blindfold and sunshine juries -- different from one another. However, in 
this instance, we are about 80% confident that our conclusion is correct --i.e., that Dawn will 
recover more often under a sunshine rule (rather than the 95% confidence supporting H 1, H2, 
and H4). We should also point out that the McKey scenario poses a severe challenge for juries 
motivated to make an award to the plaintiff. The blindfold juries found Dawn to be 65.6% at 
fault.(n191) Sunshine juries would have to allocate sixteen percent more fault to defendants for 
Dawn to recover. We suspect that, for sunshine scenarios in which the plaintiffs' fault would be 
perceived under a blindfold rule to be closer to fifty percent, there would be a larger proportion 
of plaintiff victories. In sum, there is weak evidence that the sunshine rule will produce more 
frequent plaintiff awards than the blindfold rule, especially when the plaintiffs' perceived fault is 
close to fifty percent(n192)  
H6: The mean dollar recovery of the plaintiff from all juries in the sunshine sample will be larger 
than from those in the blindfold sample.  
Rationale: If, as we hypothesized in H5, the sunshine plaintiff will recover an ultimate award 
more often, based on that factor alone, the mean sunshine recovery should be larger than the 
mean blindfold recovery.  
ER6: The mean ultimate recovery for the sunshine plaintiff was $1,029,186;(n193) for the 
blindfold plaintiff, it was $973,622.(n194) Based on the t-test difference of means test (t=.15, 
d.f.=80, p=.44), there is no statistically significant difference between these numbers. H6 is not 
supported by the data. The explanation appears to be that, although the sunshine plaintiff wins an 
ultimate award more often, that award tends to be smaller. Table 6 indicates the verdict results 
from the Base blindfold juries that made an award to Dawn. The average award for these twelve 
blindfold juries was $3,164,273.(n195) From Table 7, the average award made by the seventeen 
Variant sunshine juries was $2,606,234.(n196) Assuming that the same number of cases would 
be filed and decided under either rule, based on these data, the total payout to plaintiffs would be 
roughly the same under either rule. It is arguable that a compensation system that produces more 
frequent relief, even if it is less complete relief-- such as we see under the sunshine condition -- 
is preferable to one that has the lottery aspects of much of the present tort litigation system. No-
fault systems like workers' compensation are based on this proposition.  
SUMMING UP THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
The mean verdict data strongly support the proposition that jurors who are aware of a percentage 
bar to recovery will react in ways generally perceived to be more favorable to the plaintiff than 
will jurors who are not privy to that information,(n197) Sunshine juries tend to increase the fault 
percentages of the defendants, but may do so disproportionately if so guided by the evidence and 
the attorneys' arguments. There is initial but weak evidence that sunshine juries will make 
ultimate awards more often to negligent plaintiffs, but even those juries that do not make an 
award tend to attribute lower percentages of fault to plaintiffs than do blindfold juries. The 
ultimate awards made by sunshine juries tend to be smaller, so that even with increased 
frequency, average recovery, and presumably total recovery as well, will be about the same 
under sunshine and blindfold rules. Although it would seem that something like sympathy or 
dissatisfaction with the modified comparative fault concept has an effect on jury verdicts, the net 
economic impact of adopting either a sunshine or a blindfold rule for a jurisdiction appears to be 
statistically insignificant. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, when the plaintiff's fault 
is either slight or gross, the choice of whether to inform the jury about the percentage bar is 
likely to be immaterial.  
The Economic Effects of Four Defensive Rule Regimes  
The verdict data from this experiment provide an excellent opportunity to compare the economic 
effect four negligence defense rules would have on a typical case.  
Contributory Negligence as a Complete Defense  
Every one of the juries that rendered verdicts in McKey v. Torino Pizza found the plaintiff to be 
partially at fault. Presumably, under a contributory negligence rule, Dawn would recover nothing 
in every instance. We have read, however, that juries under this rule in the past have made 
ultimate awards to plaintiffs in derogation of the instructions and their findings.(n198) It would 
be interesting to test empirically how often that would happen with McKey juries charged under 
a contributory negligence instruction.  
Pure Comparative Fault 
The blindfold juries, whose verdicts are tabulated in Table 1, received what was essentially a 
pure comparative fault instruction. If pure comparative fault were the rule in Indiana, the mean 
recovery for Dawn would be $1,414,629.(n199)  
Modified Comparative Fault Under a Blindfold Rule 
If the Table 1 juries' verdicts are adjusted for modified comparative fault with a 51% percentage 
bar to recovery and the juries are instructed under a blindfold rule as this experiment assumes, 
and as Table 2 illustrates, Dawn's mean recovery would be $973,622.(n200) There seems little 
doubt that modified comparative fault favors defendants significantly more than does the pure 
system.  
Modified Comparative Fault Under a Sunshine Rule 
If we assume that the verdict results found in Table 3 are from juries similar to those tabulated in 
Tables 1 and 2, we see that the mean award under modified comparative fault where the jury 
learns of the 51% recovery bar would be $1,029,186.(n201) As noted, the aggregate economic 
difference between applying and lifting the blindfold in modified comparative fault cases appears 
to be statistically insignificant.(n202)  
The Generalizability Question  
In the behavioral sciences, laboratory experiments are vulnerable to the criticism that they lack 
realism, and as a result generalization may not be justified. But as Ilgen points out:  
It is well accepted that all research, regardless of setting, requires trade-offs .... Thus all settings, 
whether laboratory, field, or some combination of the two, create contextual conditions that have 
both advantages and disadvantages for contributing to knowledge that generalizes to human 
behavior in ongoing organizations. For example, the naturalness of the field setting is purchased 
at the cost of control. Without some control, it is often impossible to disentangle the effects of 
many different covarying and confounded variables on the behaviors of interest. Is it better to 
obtain more realism going to the field yet sacrificing control, or is it better to gain control in the 
laboratory but lose some of the naturalism?(n203)  
"The obvious answer," he says, "is that it depends."(n204)  
Ilgen concludes that there are four sets of conditions that are relevant to the use of laboratory 
research: 1) when high fidelity can be established between laboratory and field; 2) when 
"laboratory conditions are to be recreated in the field"; 3) when "field conditions limit the 
feasibility of field research"; and 4) when "the hypothesis of interest is one demanding an effect 
rather than direct generalization of that effect to a particular setting."(n205)  
In this experiment, we took pains to maximize the fidelity of the lab setting to the field setting of 
a real trial. First, we chose a real trial for the simulation models.(n206) We excerpted the 
testimony, exhibits, arguments, and instructions from the actual trial transcript. We built a 
realistic courtroom set and cast lawyers in the roles of the judge and counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant. The jurors observed a four hour simulation, long enough to develop the issues in a 
realistic manner, and most important, the jurors deliberated in panels similar in size to the actual 
juries that hear these cases. When asked on the exit survey whether their jury panel's 
deliberations were conducted as if this were a real trial; whether a real jury likely would have 
reached approximately the same result; whether they were satisfied with their panel's verdict; 
whether their panel's verdict was fair; and whether the process in reaching it was fair; 
overwhelming majorities of the individual jurors agreed or strongly agreed.(n207) Ilgen's 
condition of high fidelity was met.  
Ilgen's second condition applies in the sense that the lab experiment seeks to test instructional 
rules that could be implemented in the field. Just as it makes sense to test prototype machinery in 
the lab before deploying units in the field, it makes sense to test blindfold and sunshine rules in 
the lab before enacting them as legislation.  
Ilgen's third condition involves field constraints, such as time, expense, ethics, threats to health 
and safety, and the impossibility of field research. Lab research permits time compression 
consistent with fidelity imperatives. Studying the events of real trials would be hugely time 
consuming. Field research, if it were possible, would be prohibitively expensive. Both ethical 
and legal constraints impinge on the ability of field researchers to study what goes on in the jury 
room. And because of "the covarying and confounded variables on the behaviors of 
interest,"(n208) replicating lab research in the field is really not feasible, because of insufficient 
control.  
The fourth condition under which lab research may be indicated is when the researchers are 
seeking to determine whether an effect can happen, rather than that it will happen under field 
conditions. We have shown that manipulating an independent variable by replacing a blindfold 
rule with a sunshine rule can have an effect on student mock juror subjects. Although we can not 
say with certainty that real jurors under field conditions will react the same, we think the 
evidence from our experiment is persuasive. There is also substantial empirical evidence that lab 
research using student subjects does generalize to field settings.(n209) While the dollar awards 
and the magnitude of differences may not be the same in a real world setting as is reported in this 
study, it is likely that the same general findings would be reached. We would urge that the 
external validity of our study be tested by replication.  
CONCLUSION  
From 1931 to the middle 1970s, every state adopting the modified form of comparative fault also 
opted to blindfold their civil juries with respect to the existence of a fifty or fifty-one percent bar 
to the plaintiff's recovery. In the late '70s, however, there was a dramatic turnabout: every new 
adopter of modification, and several that had earlier opted for blindfolding, either mandated or 
permitted this percentage bar information to be disclosed to the jury. That is, until 1995, when 
the Illinois General Assembly reverted to blindfolding Illinois juries under the rubric of "tort 
reform." The Assembly apparently concluded that blindfolding would benefit the state's 
economy by reducing the liability exposure of businesses, professionals, governmental entities, 
and other constituencies often found to be defendants in tort cases. It is likely that other states 
will be persuaded by this reasoning to follow Illinois's lead despite the lack of empirical evidence 
to support it.  
In this article, the authors chronicle and analyze these events. While we take no political or 
philosophical position for or against jury blindfolding, we argue that legislation designed to 
produce an aggregate economic effect should, if at all possible, be empirically tested, preferably 
before enactment. To that end, we designed and executed a lab experiment to compare modified 
comparative fault verdicts rendered under blindfold rules against those rendered under sunshine 
rules. The data indicate that civil juries respond to sunshine rules by lowering the percentage of 
fault attributable to plaintiffs, but they also appear to temper this generosity by making smaller 
awards. While there is weak evidence that sunshine plaintiffs, under facts similar to those of the 
experiment, will recover damages more frequently, their mean dollar recovery will be no greater 
than under the blindfold rule. Thus, it can be argued that the aggregate effect of the two rules on 
the economy of the jurisdiction will be about the same.  
Tort reform proponents will assert that, if a rule produces more frequent plaintiff victories, it will 
stimulate litigation and its attendant costs. We respond that smaller victories inhibit 
litigation(n210) so that the net economic effect of implementing sunshine rules is likely to be 
negligible. To the extent that our student jury verdicts are generalizable(n211)--and we believe 
we have made the case that our evidence is probative--the reimplementation of blindfold rules 
with respect to the percentage of negligence question will prove to be ineffective tort reform.  
UPDATE  
On December 18, 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court declared several core provisions of the 1995 
Civil Justice Reform Act to be unconstitutional and the Act as a whole to be "void in its 
entirety."(n212) The principal target of the court's holding was the statute's $500,000 limitation 
on non-economic damages.(n213) With respect to the section on "[j]ury instructions in tort 
actions,"(n214) of which the blindfold rule on the percentage of negligence was a part, the court 
declared this rule and the one requiring disclosure of the non-taxability of damages to be "not 
clearly invalid."(n215) But because the invalidity of the damages cap and several other 
provisions left only "a residue" of what was supposed to be a comprehensive legislative 
initiative, the court refused to sever the valid provisions from the invalid.(n216) At this writing it 
is uncertain whether even the valid sections will be reenacted.(n217)  
The supreme court discussed three scholarly affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs to challenge 
the eighteen findings placed in the preamble of the Act, upon which the Illinois General 
Assembly had relied to justify its tort reform initiative.(n218) The affidavits summarized a 
number of empirical field studies that found little or no adverse economic impact traceable to the 
type of civil litigation system in effect prior to the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform 
Act.(n219) The plaintiffs argued that, based on these studies, there could be :no rational basis for 
the legislation.(n220) The empirical evidence relied on by the legislature, they charged, had been 
"chiefly anecdotal."(n221)  
The court stated it was powerless to "`adjudicate' the accuracy of legislative findings .... [Its] task 
is limited to determining whether the challenged legislation is constitutional, and not whether it 
is wise."(n222) But by simply discussing the plaintiffs' empirical evidence, the supreme court 
appeared to be declaring that legislatures have a duty to base legislation on sound factual 
findings, even though the findings may not be subject to judicial review. When the Illinois 
General Assembly meets to reconsider the rule against disclosing to civil juries the existence of a 
percentage bar to recovery, it is to be hoped it will seek out valid empirical studies--including 
those that employ the laboratory methods of social psychology--to guide its legislative course of 
action.  
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(n1) See infra notes 72-74, 94-96 and accompanying text.  
(n2) This article focuses on rules that prohibit, require, or permit disclosure of the existence of a 
percentage bar to the plaintiffs recovery under modified comparative fault. Currently, only four 
modified comparative fault states blindfold on this issue: Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
Sections 5/2-1107.1 (1996) (reprinted in its entirety infra note 12); Ohio, McClure v. Neuman, 
178 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Texas, TEX. R. CIV. P. 277; and Wisconsin, McGowan 
v. Story, 234 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1975).  
Some states prohibit, require, or permit disclosure of other legal consequences to civil juries such 
as the question of who pays if a defendant is insolvent, immune or unavailable for suit, or if a 
nonparty is found to be partially at fault in causing the harm complained of. E.g., COLO. REV. 
STAT. Sections 13-21-111.5(5) (1996) provides that "the jury shall not be informed as to the 
effect of its finding as to the allocation of fault among two or more defendants." WYO. STAT. 
Sections 1-1-109 (1996) provides that the trial court shall "[i]nform the jury. of the consequences 
of its determination of the percentage of fault," which has been interpreted to mean that the jury 
must be informed as to the 51% percentage bar to recovery; that the court will reduce the award 
by the plaintiffs percentage of fault; that each defendant will be liable only to the extent of its 
percentage of fault (no joint and several liability); and that the plaintiff cannot recover for 
negligence attributed to a nonparty. However, the jury is not to be informed when a defendant is 
insolvent. John M. Burman, Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute, 31 LAND & WATER 
L. REV. 509, 529-30 (1996), citing Wyo. Civ. Pattern Jury Instruc. Nos. 10.03, 10.05 (1994) and 
Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1222 n.6 (Wyo. 1986). The Illinois statute forbids 
the court to disclose to the jury. limitations on non-economic and punitive damages, but requires 
the court to inform the jury that verdict awards will be non-taxable. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
Sections 5/2-1107.1 (1996), See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.  
(n3) For an excellent discussion of jury nullification, see JEFFREY ABRAHAMSON, WE THE 
JURY 57-95 and references 266-72 (1994), The author describes the 1735 trial of John Peter 
Zenger for the "infamous crime of seditious libel," a law that made it criminal to publish "written 
censure upon any public man whatsoever, or upon any law or institution whatsoever." 
ABRAHAMSON, supra, at 73-74. The jury ignored the court's instruction to limit its findings to 
whether the defendant had published the clearly censorious material and it acquitted Zenger. 
Abrahamson refers to the Zenger case as "the defining moment for the American jury in the 
colonies." Id. at 73-74. The author tells us that "[w]ell into the nineteenth century, criminal juries 
frequently (and civil juries occasionally) were instructed that the judge's statement of law was 
not binding on them; that they could determine for themselves what the law was." Id. at 63-64 
(citations omitted). Jury nullification is generally discussed in the context of the criminal law 
where the power to acquit is bolstered by the double jeopardy doctrine. Civil verdicts are subject 
to the trial court's power to order remittitur, and the appellate court's power to reverse large 
judgments on the ground that the verdicts must have been motivated by passion or prejudice 
sufficient to shock the court's conscience. See also Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal 
Trials in America, 1776-1996, 99 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2736-37 (1996) (speculating that jury 
nullification may be the wave of the future).  
(n4) ABRAHAMSON, supra note 3, at 91-92.  
(n5) We define "sunshine rule" as a rule requiring or permitting the legal consequences of a jury 
finding to be made open and transparent to the jury. We analogize here to the term "sunshine 
law," a law mandating that meetings of governmental bodies be open to the public. See, e.g., 
James E. Costello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to 
Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 514 n. 119 (1986). In contrast, courts and 
commentators have used the term "blindfold" to characterize rules that bar disclosing to juries 
the legal consequences of their findings. See, e.g., Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 395 (Haw. 
1986); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881, 882 (W. Va. 1982); Moore v. Swoboda, 571 N.E.2d 
1056, 1063 (Ill. Ct. App 1991); Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 273 
(1955); Michael J. Norton, Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co. -- Jury Blindfolding 
in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 569.  
Sunshine rules can be "mandated," see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT, ANN. 13-21-111.5(5) (West 
Supp. 1995) ("[T]he court shall instruct the jury.., as to the degree of negligence .... "); 
"requested," see, e.g., Adkins v. Whitten, 297 N.E.2d 881, 884 (W. Va. 1982) (court has duty to 
inform jury when requested); or "discretionary," see, e.g., Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322, 327 
(N.J. 1980) (court should inform jury of effect of answers to interrogatories, but has the 
discretion to withhold).  
(n6) For lists and analysis of the authorities for these provisions, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, Appendix B, at 391-419 (2d ed. 1986 and Supp. 1993) 
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ]; HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT 22-
26, Appendix 515-932 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter WOODS].  
The following modified comparative fault states set their percentage bar to recovery at 50%; in 
these states, a finding of equal fault on the part of plaintiff and defendant means that the plaintiff 
is barred from all recovery: Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Maine, Neb., N.D., Tenn., Utah, 
W. Va. WOODS, supra Sections 1:11, at 24-25. This rule is sometimes referred to as the Georgia 
plan, after the first state to apply the rule. Id. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of why this formula is particularly problematic under a blindfold rule.  
The following modified comparative fault states set their percentage bar at 51%; in these states a 
plaintiff whose fault is equal to that of the defendant recovers 50% of her damages: Conn., Del., 
Haw.*, Ill.*, Ind., Iowa*, Mass.*, Minn.*, Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., Ohio, Okla.*, Ore.*, Pa., 
S.C., Tex., Vt., Wis.*, Wyo.*. This rule is referred to as the New Hampshire plan. States marked 
with an asterisk have switched from the Georgia to the New Hampshire plan. WOODS, supra, 
Sections 1:11, at 23-24.  
In three states, Wis., Minn., and Idaho, if there are multiple defendants, the plaintiffs fault must 
be compared with each defendant's separately so that where plaintiff "is 30% negligent and 
defendants D, E, F are 25%, 25%, and 20% negligent respectively, plaintiff recovers nothing." 
WOODS, supra., Sections 13:1, at 226.  
(n7) For cases and commentary generally in favor of blindfold rules, see McClure v. Neuman, 
178 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) ("Where the court indicates how liability will be 
determined, it warns the jury of the result of its answers and permits the jury to `trim its course 
accordingly.'") (quoting 59 Ohio Opinions 381); McGowan v. Story, 234 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 
1975) ("[I]t is reversible error for either the court or counsel to inform the jury of the effect of 
their answer on the ultimate result of their verdict .... "). See also infra notes 66-85 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the Wisconsin experience; James G. Denton, Informing a 
Jury of the Legal Effect of its Answers, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 10 (1970) (arguing that in 
jurisdictions using a "special issues" (special verdict questions) system, the system's purposes 
"would best be served by limiting the jury's considerations to the facts and not their 
consequences"); Coleman Gay, Blindfolding the Jury: Another View, 34 TEX. L. REV. 368, 380 
(1956) ("If juries are to be allowed to disregard the court's instructions and to decide for one 
party or the other regardless of the evidence, the parties' rights will depend solely on the 
conscience of the particular jury trying the case."); Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing the 
Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1975 
DUKE L.J. 824, 851 (concluding that informing the jury where special verdicts are used 
"violates the comparative negligence scheme established by the legislature or the highest court of 
a state .... "). For authorities from pure comparative fault states favoring blindfolding juries from 
information other than the existence of a percentage bar, see Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA 
Ins. Co. 557 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ky. 1977) ("In order to [decide contested issues of fact] there is 
no need for jurors to know the legal effect of their resolution .... "); Mitchell v. Perkins, 54 
N.W.2d 293, 296 (Mich. 1952) (holding that, in Michigan, a general verdict state, the jury must 
not be told in advance what facts are necessary to support the verdict).  
For cases and commentary generally opposed to blindfold rules, see Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 
(Haw. 1986) (arguing that attempts to keep the jury in the dark will be unavailing); Seppi v. 
Betty, 579 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1978) (pointing out the danger of failing to inform the jury in states 
where a 50-50 finding of equal fault bars the plaintiff from recovering); Moore v. Swoboda, 571 
N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("The failure to inform the jury of the effect of its findings in 
such circumstances [one percentage point difference can mean no recovery] may result in a 
decision shaped by a misimpression of the law."); Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322 (1980) 
(observing that, before comparative fault, jurors were traditionally informed of the legal effect of 
a contributory negligence finding); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1982) ("[U]nder 
our jury trial system, it is incumbent on the court., o to inform the jury as to the law that is 
applicable to the facts of the case."); Green, supra note 5, at 282 ("[T]here is no blindfold known 
that will prevent a jury from thinking they know the legal effect of their answers."); Glenn E 
Smith, Comparative Negligence Problems with the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of the 
Legal Effects of Their Answers, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 199, 226-28 (1975) (arguing that 
the blindfold rule leads to erroneous suppositions by juries seeking an ultimate outcome); Note, 
Informing the Jury of the Effect of its Answers to Special Verdict Questions -- The Minnesota 
Experience, 58 MINN. L. REV. 903, 927 (1974) (arguing that the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
attempt to limit disclosure only to comparative negligence cases was misguided because the rule 
"does not consider the role of the common sense wisdom of juries in mitigating unfair laws and 
producing just results in individual cases"); Norton, supra note 5, at 581 ("[A] continued 
parroting of unfounded concern over jury sympathy and bias [will] result in nothing more than 
the preservation of a useless and even counterproductive doctrine.").  
(n8) The comparative negligence amendments were part of The Civil Justice Reform 
Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 224 (West) (codified in scattered 
sections of ILL. REV. STAT. chs. 430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, 820 (West Supp. 1996)).  
(n9) See generally Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy 
Explanation, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 803, 816 (1996). For a discussion of the Illinois experience, 
see infra notes 116-57 and accompanying text.  
(n10) Dillard, supra note 9, at 816 (1996).  
(n11)See infra note 58 for a list of the 33 states currently maintaining modified comparative fault 
systems and the source of each.  
(n12) Former ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, par. 2-1107.1 was converted to new 735 ILL. COMP.  
STAT. Sections 5/2-1107.1 (West 1996) as follows: Jury instruction in tort actions. In all actions 
on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property based on negligence, or 
product liability based on [any theory or doctrine, strict tort liability, the court shall instruct the 
jury in writing, to the extent it is true, that any award of compensatory damages or punitive 
damages will not be taxable under federal or State income tax law. The court shall not inform or 
instruct the jury] that the defendants shall be, found not liable if the jury finds that the 
contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage for which recovery is sought, [but it shall be the duty of the court to deny recovery if the 
jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory fault is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the 
injury or damage. The court shall not inform or instruct the jury concerning any limitations in the 
amount of non-economic damages or punitive damages that are recoverable, but it shall be the 
duty of the trial court upon entering judgment to reduce any award in excess of such limitation to 
no more than the proper limitation.]  
[This amendatory Act of 1995 applies to causes of action filed on or after its effective date]. The 
Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act of 1995 (sometimes referred to as the Illinois Tort Reform Act) 
is reproduced with strikeouts from, and additions to, the old statute at 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 819 
(1996).  
(n13) See infra notes 21-65 and accompanying text.  
(n14) See infra notes 66-157 and accompanying text.  
(n15) See infra notes 177-80, 188-92 and accompanying text.  
(n16) See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.  
(n17) See infra note 198 and accompanying text.  
(n18) See infra note 199 and accompanying text.  
(n19) See infra note 200 and accompanying text.  
(n20) See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.  
(n21) See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN., Section 16-64-122(c) (1997) ("The word fault as used in 
this section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of 
any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party."); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. Section 5/2 1116(b) (West 1996) ("Fault means any act or omission that (i) is 
negligent, willful and wanton, or reckless, is a breach of an express or implied warranty, gives 
rise to strict liability in tort, or gives rise to liability under the provisions of any state statute, rule, 
or local ordinance .... "); IND CODE Section 34-4-33-2(a)(1) (1997) ("`Fault' includes any act or 
omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless or intentional toward the person or property 
of others .... ") (emphasis added).  
With respect to strict liability, in the leading case, Daly v. General Motors Corp, 575 P.2d 1162 
(Cal. 1978), the court held that, while there were "theoretical and semantic distinctions between 
the twin principles of strict product liability and traditional . . . negligence they can be blended 
and accommodated." Id. at 1167. For a discussion of the role of strict liability in the 
transformation of comparative negligence into comparative fault, see Jordan H. Leibman, 
Comparative Contribution and Intentional Torts: A Remaining Roadblock to Damages 
Apportionment, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 678, 684-87 (1992).  
(n22) Early federal and state legislation applied comparative negligence principles to cases 
involving injured workers, but in 1910, Mississippi enacted a "pure" form statute that applied to 
all negligence actions. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(B), at 11-12; WOODS, supra 
note 6, Section 1:11, at 19-20.  
(n23) See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
Section 65, at 451 n.1 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] ("The earliest 
contributory negligence case is Butterfield v. Forrester, 1809, 11 East 60, 193 Eng. Rep. 926.").  
(n24) "The first American case appears to have been Smith w Smith, 1824, 19 Mass. (2 Pick) 
621." Id.; See also WOODS, supra note 6, Section 1:3, at 5-6.  
(n25) SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.3, at 8; WOODS, supra note 6, Section 1:9, at 13-14.  
(n26) See Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L REV. 189, 
220-25 (1950).  
(n27) See William Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1953). `The last 
vestiges of the complete defense disappeared long since from continental Europe, which divides 
the damages, Great Britain, all of the Canadian provinces, New Zealand... have come to the same 
result so that little of the British Empire is left with the common law rule." Id. at 2; WOODS, 
supra note 6, at 14.  
(n28) See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.3(B), at 9-10; WOODS, supra note 6, Section 
1:10, at 14-17.  
(n29) Prosser, supra note 27, at 4.  
(n30) See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, Section 65, at 452-53. The authors suggest 
that the defense has "a penal basis in which the plaintiff is punished for his own misconduct"; or 
it may derive from the equitable "clean hands" doctrine, or based on a proximate cause analysis, 
the plaintiffs negligence may be seen as "an intervening, or insulating cause" of her injury. The 
concept of contributory negligence tracks with the tendency of early 19th century courts to look 
for "a single, principal, dominant, `proximate' cause of every injury." The complete defense's 
harsh bar to recovery is said to discourage accidents and to represent "the highly individualistic 
attitude of the common law" reflecting "an uneasy distrust of the plaintiff-minded jury . . . in the 
early 19th century." Finally, it accommodated "a desire to keep the liabilities of growing 
industries within some bounds."  
This last rationale is explored in MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977). Horowitz describes how American courts in the last two 
thirds of the 19th century profoundly restructured common law rules to accommodate economic 
development. Laissez faire ideas transformed the common law of contracts while liability-
limiting rules dominated the evolution of tort law. The emergence of modern negligence 
principles to replace the causation-based rules of trespass was the principal engine for this 
accommodation because negligence theory required plaintiffs to prove fault in addition to 
causation.  
(n31) See WOODS, supra note 6, Section 1:15, at 8-9.  
(n32) See WOODS, supra note 6, Sub-Section 1:16-17, at 9-11. The "last clear chance" doctrine 
negates the contributory negligence defense when the defendant is aware (or in some states, 
should be aware) that he can prevent injury to a negligent plaintiff and fails to do so. Judge 
Woods notes that "[a] number of commentators have observed that last clear chance is one step, 
and a rather significant one, toward a system of comparative negligence." Id. Section 1:7, at 12.  
Among the limitations imposed by courts in addition to "last clear chance" are the requirement 
that it would not be contributory negligence if the plaintiffs were not warned of specific hazards; 
or if the plaintiff were acting in an emergency to save human life or valuable property; or when 
the plaintiffs attention was diverted by the defendant's signs; or when the defendant has acted 
intentionally, recklessly, or wantonly; or when the defendant's act was subject to absolute 
liability. Id. Section 1:6, at 9-10.  
(n33) For a discussion of the Illinois experience, see infra notes 116-57 and accompanying text.  
(n34) See WOODS, supra note 6, at 601 (citing the statute now appearing at GA. CODE ANN. 
Section 46-8-291).  
(n35) 79 S.E. 836 (Ga, 1913).  
(n36) Id. (quoting the statute now appearing at GA. CODE ANN, Section 51-11-7).  
(n37) Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 47 S.E. 923 (Ga. 1904).  
(n38) Id.  
(n39) Act of April 22, 1908, oh. 149, Section 3, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S.C. Section 53.  
(n40) SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(A), at 11. Schwartz notes that, in 1920, Congress 
incorporated the same principles into the Jones Act, Act of June 5, 1920, oh. 250, Section 33, 
Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. Section 688 (protecting seamen suffering injury or death); and the Death 
on the High Seas Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1920, ch. 111, Section 6, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. Section 
766. Id.  
(n41) Id.  
(n42) Currently codified at MISS. CODE ANN. Section 11-7-15 (1997).  
(n43) SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(B), at 11-12.  
(n44) Id. at 12. For a discussion of the Wisconsin experience, see infra notes 66-85 and 
accompanying text.  
(n45) See infra note 76 and accompanying text.  
(n46) "The influence of Wisconsin on the adoption of [comparative negligence] and its 
interpretation has been enormous." WOODS, supra note 6, at 920.  
(n47) Id. at 12.  
(n48) WOODS, supra note 6, Section 1:11, at 21-22.  
(n49) Id. at 20-21. Arkansas's first statute provided for the pure form, and it required mandatory 
special verdicts. The stats's insurance bar was displeased with the pure form and the plaintiffs bar 
was unhappy because it found rural jurors were unable to understand the special verdict 
questions. The statute was replaced in 1957 with a modified statute having a 50% recovery bar 
and no mandatory special verdicts. Id.  
(n50) See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(B), at 12-13.  
(n51) Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), the case felling the citadel of 
privity in warranty cases thus opening the door to the much wider use of breach of implied 
warranty as a quasi-tort strict liability theory, and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962), the case establishing and articulating the policies underpinning strict 
liability in tort for defective products (Section 402A liability) were both decided during the early 
part of the 1960s. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, Section 97, at 690-94. "Section 
402A liability in tort swept the country, just as the expansion of warranty liability under 
Henningsen had done .... "Id. at 694.  
(n52) SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(B), at 13-14 & n.39.  
(n53) Id. at 13-14.  
(n54) See id. Section 1.6, at 26 ("Reform of the fault system appears to be a compromise 
between pressures for `no-fault' systems on one side and for the status quo on the other. Because 
comparative negligence is an important part of this compromise, it is likely to become the law in 
all states in the near future.").  
(n55) 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).  
(n56) The following states judicially adopted and currently maintain the pure form of 
comparative fault: Alaska, Cal., Fla., Ken., Mich., Mo., N.M. WOODS, supra note 6, Section 
1:11, at 22-23. W. Va., S.C., Tenn., judicially adopted modified systems, Id. at 22. Illinois 
initially adopted judicially the pure form but later switched legislatively to a modified system. 
See infra notes 14346 and accompanying text.  
(n57) In addition to the seven judicial-adoption, pure form states listed supra note 56, the 
following have enacted the pure form: La., Miss., N.Y., R.I., Wash. WOODS, supra note 6, 
Section 1:11, at 22-23. Arkansas originally enacted a pure form statute, but switched to the 
modified form. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
(n58) The following are the 33 states that have enacted or have judicially adopted modified 
comparative fault; the source of each is indicated: ARIZ. REV. STAT. Sub-Section 12-2501, 12-
2505, 12-2506, 12-2508, and 12-2509 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. Sub-Section 16-64-122 
(1991); COLO. REV. STAT. Section 13-21-111.5 and 13-21-111.7 (1973 & Supp. 1978); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Section 52572h (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE tit. 10, 8 8132 
(1984); GA. CODE ANN. Sub-Section 51-12-31:, 1512-32, 51-12-33 (1987); HAW. REV. 
STAT. Section 663-10.9 (1991); IDAHO CODE Sub-Section 6-801 to 6-806 (1987); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. Section 5/2 1107.1, 5/2-1116, 5/2-1117 (West 1996); IND. CODE 88 34-4-33-1 
to 34-4-33-12 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. Section 619.17 Sub-Section 668.1 to 668.10 (1984); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. Section60-258a and 60-258b (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 8 156 
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, Section 85 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
Sub-Section 604.01 and 604.01 (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. Sub-Section27-1-719(5) 27-
1-702, 27-1-703 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. Sub-Section 2521,185 through 25-21,185.12 (1992); 
NEV. REV. STAT. Section 41.141 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub-Section 507:7-d, 
507:7-e (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. Sub-Section 2A:15:5.1, 2A:15-5.2, 2A:15-5.3 (Supp. 1980-
81); N.D. CENT. CODE Section 32-03.2-02 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE Sub-Section 2315.19, 
2315.20 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, Sub-Section 13 to 14 (West Supp. 1980-
81); OR. REV. STAT. Sub-Section 18.470, 18.475 to 18.490; 818.510 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 42, Section 7102(A) (Purdon Supp. 1980); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 
1992); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991); TEX. CIV PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. Sub-Section 33.001, 33.002, 33.003, 33.011, 33.012, 33.013 (1987); UTAH CODE 
ANN. Sub-Section 78-27-37 to 7827-42 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 8 1036 (1979); Bradley 
v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. Section 895.045 
(West Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. Section 1-1109 (1995).  
(n59) WOODS, supra note 6, 8 1:11 at 25.  
(n60) Ala., Md., N.C., Va. Id.  
(n61) See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.  
(n62) "There is no better justification for allowing a defendant who is 49% at fault to escape 
liability than there is to allow a defendant who is 99% at fault under the old rule [contributory 
negligence] to escape liability." Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981). See PROSSER 
& KEETON, supra note 23, Sections 67 at 473 n.42 (listing authorities for and against the 
modified system). The modified system of comparative fault has been described as "simply 
shift[ing] the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground." Nga Li v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (Cal. 1975).  
(n63) There is a split of authority whether each party's causal contribution to an injury should be 
compared as well as the relative fault of the parties. One view holds that "once causation is 
found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of comparative fault rather than 
contribution." William Presser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 481 (1953). 
Other authorities argue that both fault and causal contribution should be compared. See 
WOODS, supra note 6, Sections 5:4, at 118-19 (discussing commentators and cases advancing 
this view). However the instruction is couched, it is clear that the jury will consider the quality of 
the acts proximately causing the injury in making their apportionment.  
There is also the problem of apportioning causation. Once multiple causes have joined to 
produce an indivisible injury, it is not simple to develop a principled method for assigning causal 
portions to all antecedent actors. In the late 1970s, in several product liability cases, courts 
ostensibly apportioned damages using a theory of comparative causation, the most noteworthy 
being General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The effect was to reduce the 
plaintiffs judgment rendered under strict liability in proportion to the causal contribution of the 
plaintiffs "unforeseeable misuse." The goal was to circumvent the "apples and oranges" problem 
of comparing negligence with strict liability. The concept is discussed in Aaron D. Twerski, The 
Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 
MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978).  
Other writers have sought to develop a general theory of causal apportionment for tort cases. See 
Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic 
Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1398 (1980). These authors employ the concept of "probabilistic 
marginal product" (PMP) to develop a methodology for assigning damage shares in simultaneous 
cause cases "by measuring the differential degree of risk to which each cause exposes the 
plaintiff." Id. at 1408. This approach was criticized in David Kaye & Mikel Aicken, A Comment 
on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 219 (1986).  
(n64) See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.  
(n65) With respect to a percentage bar to recovery, the court may be required, forbidden, or 
permitted to disclose its existence, either upon a party's request or at the court's discretion. See 
supra note 5. The jurisdiction may also provide how the disclosure is to take place, how prior 
knowledge and logical inferences are to be handled, and whether counsel may argue the 
information to the jury. See, e.g., IND. CODE Sections 34-4-33.5(2) (1995): "If the percentage 
of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the 
incident which caused the claimant's death, injury, or property damage, the jury shall return a 
verdict for the defendant and no further deliberation of the jury is required." Although the 
existence of the 51% bar is less than explicit, it is virtually certain the jury will infer it.  
(n66) Although Wisconsin has relied heavily on the use of special verdicts over the years, the 
procedure has not been incorporated specifically into the state's comparative negligence statute. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Sections 17.4, at 302. Rather, the courts are to refer to the general 
special verdict statute codified at WIS. STAT. Sections 805.12 (1996). Subsection (1) provides:  
Unless it orders otherwise, the court shall direct the jury to return a special verdict. The verdict 
shall be prepared by the court in the form of written questions relating only to material issues of 
ultimate fact and admitting a direct answer. The jury shall answer in writing. In cases founded 
upon negligence, the court need not submit separately any particular respect in which the party 
was allegedly negligent. The court may also direct the jury to find upon particular questions of 
fact.  
See WOODS, supra note 6, at 921 (noting that the Judicial Council Committee note to the statute 
states that "[s]ubsection (1) is based on a recognition that in Wisconsin practice, the special 
verdict is the rule and not the exception").  
(n67) A special verdict "is a special finding of facts of the case by a jury, leaving to the court the 
application of the law to the facts thus found" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1731 (4th ed. 
1968). A general verdict is "[t]hat by which [the jury] pronounce[s] generally upon all or any of 
the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant;--distinguished from a special verdict, 
which is that by which the jury finds facts only." Id.  
A general verdict accompanied by special interrogatories is a hybrid form in which the jury 
answers specific fact questions but is also required to render a verdict for or against either party. 
See Nollenberger v. United Airlines, Inc., 335 F.2d 379, 405 n.41 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 
U.S. 951 (1964) (applying FED. R CIV. P. 49(b), which provides in pertinent part that the "court 
may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written 
interrogateries upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict"). 
Rule 49(a) provides that "[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the 
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). Because the 
form of verdict is a matter of procedural law, the federal rules take precedence in diversity cases. 
Thus, even in a state like Wisconsin, where "special verdicts are the rule," see supra note 66 and 
accompanying text, a federal district court sitting in diversity could require a general verdict with 
interrogatories. Although Professor Schwartz supports special verdict practice in comparative 
fault cases, see infra note 69, he also looks with favor on the Rule 49(b) procedure: "A newer 
procedural device, jury interrogatories, captures most of the advantages of the special verdict 
procedures but avoids its disadvantages." SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Sections 17.4, at 307.  
(n68) Wisconsin's special verdict submissions in negligence cases require written answers to 
detailed questions asking the jury to determine whether the parties were negligent in the 
performance or omission of specific acts and whether those acts or omissions were causes of the 
injury complained of. Only if the jury finds negligent acts or omissions to have caused the injury 
is it to proceed to apportion negligence in percentages attributable to the parties. Finally, the jury 
is to determine the amount of damages of each type claimed. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, 
Sections 17.4, at 302. For examples of typical special verdict forms used in Wisconsin courts, 
see id. at 302-05; Smith, supra note 7, at 215 n.56. For examples of recommended special verdict 
forms and general verdict forms accompanied by interrogatories, see WOODS, supra note 6, at 
462-94.  
(n69) For a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of special verdicts generally 
and in comparative fault cases specifically, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, Sections 17.4, at 
306-08. The author lists three principal advantages: 1) Control of the Jury: "The procedure 
causes the jury to separate in its mind the question of the amount of damages plaintiff suffered 
from the question of the percentage of fault." Id. at 307-08; 2) Facilitating Judicial Review: 
"Special verdicts (or jury interrogatories) localize error and allow a court to find the remaining 
portion of the verdict valid." Id. at 308; 3) Simplification of Instructions: If it is unnecessary to 
inform the jury of the legal consequences of its findings, the instructions can be greatly 
simplified. Id. at 308-09. The first two advantages also accrue to general verdicts accompanied 
by interrogatories, but not the third. As to jury control, the author acknowledges that critics of 
special verdict procedure find this to be a disadvantage because it denies the jury "`flexibility' in 
dealing with law that may not be generally popular." Id. at 308. Schwartz points out that 
"comparative negligence is of comparatively recent legislative judgment. Therefore, the law 
should be applied as a legislature intended it, or it should be changed at that level." Id. Professor 
Schwartz notes that another disadvantage of special verdicts is the difficulty in framing the 
questions: "By accident or design, the special verdict may fail to cover all the issues in the case 
or may contain incorrect terminology." Id at 306. Schwartz supports the use of special verdicts in 
comparative fault cases:  
At first blush it is difficult to see why the application of a special verdict procedure to 
comparative negligence should be criticized. If the special verdicts are spelled out in the statute, 
the awkwardness that compromised the common-law special verdict system is eliminated. If they 
are not spelled out, recourse can be had to the useful forms developed in Wisconsin and other 
states.  
Id. at 307. Another commentator differs: "More than thirty-five years of trial experience under 
both the pure and modified systems of comparative negligence, and having cases submitted on 
both general verdicts and interrogateries have convinced the writer that in many cases a general 
verdict is preferable." WOODS, supra note 6, Sections 18:1, at 439.  
For a fascinating account of jury interrogatories gone awry, see JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL 
ACTION 368-69 (1996) (describing the famous Woburn, Massachusetts environmental pollution 
case against Beatrice Foods and W.R. Grace, in which the lawyers and judge managed to 
produce four incredibly convoluted conditional questions for the jury; "All in all, the questions 
had the quality of a text that had been translated from English into Japanese and back again." Id. 
at 369).  
(n70) Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 46 N.W. 885, 886 (Wis. 1890).  
(n71) See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.  
(n72) Banderob v. Wisconsin Central Ry., 113 N.W. 738, 751 (Wis. 1907).  
(n73) 1931 Wis. Laws 242 (current version codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. Sections 895.045 
(West Supp. 1996)). See Schaffer, supra, note 7, at 830-31.  
(n74) See supra note 66.  
(n75) Pecor v. Home Indem. Co., 291 N.W. 313 (Wis. 1940).  
(n76) See Schaffer, supra note 7, at 832 and nn.42-45 (citing the adoption of the Wisconsin 
(special verdict with blindfold) model by N.D., Tex., Kan., Ohio, Ark, Colo., Idaho, Utah, 
Wyo.).  
(n77) Id. at 832-33.  
(n78) For an excellent discussion of how jurors "expect to be involved, to a certain extent, in the 
application of the law" and "tend to dig for hidden legal meaning," see Norton, supra note 5, at 
578-79.  
(n79) Schaffer, supra note 7, at 833 (citing Banderob v. Wis. Cent. Ry., 111 N.W. 738 (Wis. 
1907)). In 1907, contributory negligence was a complete defense in Wisconsin. It is entirely 
probable that juries inferred this rule despite special verdict procedures. It seems quite unlikely 
to the authors that juries would infer the 50% bar to recovery that was enacted in 1931. On the 
contrary, juries might easily and mistakenly infer instead the existence of a pure comparative 
negligence rule.  
(n80) Id. at 834. Typically, a yes answer to an early question might imply potential liability, 
while a no would not. A Texas appellate court held that conditional questions are "permissible if 
the jury is not thereby informed of the effect of previous answers that determine the case." Id. 
(citing Schroeder v. Rainboldt, 97 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1936) (approving opinion of Comm'n 
App.)).  
(n81) "In one situation, however, the jurors may conjecture incorrectly; they may believe that a 
plaintiff whose negligence is 50% of the total recovers 50% of his damages." SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 6, Sections 17.5, at 312.  
(n82) Four reasons why juries tend to "split the difference" are given in Schaffer, supra note 7, at 
831 n.35: 1) polarization of the jury; 2) the jury's inability to draw a finer distinction; 3) a 
credibility contest resulting from conflicting evidence; 4) the jury's realistic reflection of 
responsibility. Professor Schwartz comments that, "when the jury is not aware that a plaintiff 
who is 50% negligent recovers nothing, it may casually return a 50-50 verdict as a compromise." 
He is persuaded that the jury should be informed of the legal effect of the apportionment of fault 
.... at least in 50% systems." SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Sections 17.5, at 312-13.  
(n83) Schaffer, supra note 7, at 831-32. For a list of the states that also raised their percentage 
bar to 51%, see supra note 6.  
(n84) Id. at 834-35. E.g., the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a charge would not be 
objectionable if it incidentally advised the jury of the effect of its answers. Id. (citing TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 277 promulgated by the supreme court).  
(n85) Of the nine modified comparative fault states that were the original adopters of the 
Wisconsin model, see states listed supra note 76, only Ohio, McClure v. Neuman, 178 N.E.2d 
621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); a watered down Texas, see supra note 84; and Wisconsin remain with 
the blindfold rule.  
Two pure comparative fault states, Kentucky, Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 
S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1977), and Michigan, Mitchell v. Perkins, 54 N.W. 293 (Mich. 1952), have 
taken positions against informing juries about the legal consequences of their findings. However, 
these states have no percentage bar, thus jurors there, who are prone to speculate on the law in 
comparative fault cases, are likely to guess right.  
(n86) See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
(n87) 517 P.2d 416 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 526 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1974).  
(n88) Id. at 418.  
(n89) Id.  
(n90) Id.  
(n91) Id.  
(n92) Id.  
(n93) Schaffer, supra note 7, at 837 n.68.  
(n94) Simpson v. Anderson, 526 P.2d 298, 299 (Colo. 1974).  
(n95) Thomas v. Wadlingten, 526 P.2d 295, 297 (Colo. 1974).  
(n96) Id.  
(n97) COLO. REV. STAT. Section 13-21-111(4) (1975) (currently codified at Id. Section 13-21-
111.5(5) (1996)).  
(n98) See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.  
(n99) 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28 (codified at WYO. STAT. Section 1-7.2 (Michie Supp. 
1973)). The statute was amended and renumbered in 1977, amended again in 1986, and again in 
1994. Versions of the statute prior to and following the 1994 amendments are reproduced in 
Burman, supra note 2, in Appendixes A and B respectively.  
(n100) Wyo. Stat. Section 7.2(a)was identical to the Wisconsin provision. Section 7.2(b), 
however, inadvertently omitted the requirement that, in a jury trial, the judge is to reduce the 
amount of damages in proportion to the plaintiffs negligence. See Smith, supra note 7, at 200 n.5 
(quoting and discussing WYO. STAT. Section 1-7.2(b)).  
(n101) 564 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1977).  
(n102) "We hold that the intent of the Wyoming State Legislature was to adopt the Wisconsin 
judicial construction of the comparative negligence statute at the date of enactment, holding that 
is reversible error to advise the jury in argument or by instruction of the effect of its verdict." Id.  
(n103) Smith, supra note 7, at 21.6.  
(n104) Id.  
(n105) WYO. STAT. Section 1-7.7 (1976 Interim Supp.) (cited in Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 911 (Wyo. 1977) (emphasis added).  
(n106) 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).  
(n107) Id. at 913.  
(n108) Id. at 912-13. The court observed that, when Woodward was decided, Section 1-7.7 had 
been enacted, but after the verdict had been rendered, the express intent of the legislature was to 
apply the statute prospectively.  
(n109) Id. at 913-14.  
(n110) Id. at 914.  
(n111) WYO. STAT. ANN. Section 1-1-109(b) (Michie 1988).  
(n112) Wyo. Stat. Ann. Section 1-1-109(c)(i)(B) (Michie 1996).  
(n113) See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.  
(n114) Burman, supra note 2, at 552.  
(n115) Id. at 531.  
(n116) For accounts of the Illinois experience with comparative fault principles through the 
1970s, see Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Carol Isackson, Note and Comment, Pure 
Comparative Negligence in Illinois, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 599 (1982).  
(n117) See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.  
(n118) See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.  
(n119) See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.  
(n120) See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.  
(n121) See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.  
(n122) 20 Ill. 478 (1858).  
(n123) Id. at 497.  
(n124) Isackson, supra note 116, at 604 n.28.  
(n125) 421 N.E.2d at 889 (citing Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Mason, 27 Ill. pp. 
450, 453, 454 (1888)); Isackson, supra note 116, at 603.  
(n126) 421 N.E.2d at 889; Isackson, supra note 116, at 604.  
(n127) 38 N.E. 892 (Ill. 1894).  
(n128) Id. at 893.  
(n129) 421 N.E.2d at 890 (discussing the defense's unavailability to a "willful, wanton, or 
reckless" defendant, to a defendant who violated a statute enacted "to protect a plaintiff from his 
own improvident acts," and to one who had the "last clear chance" to avoid the injury; and 
although the latter doctrine was repudiated by Illinois courts it was employed nevertheless 
without labeling).  
(n130) Isackson, supra note 1.16, at 605.  
(n131) See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.  
(n132) See Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968) (Ward, J., dissenting). The plaintiff-
appellant declares, without contradiction being offered, that since 1937 there have been nine 
attempts in our legislature to change our contributory negligence rule and that with a single 
exception none reached the floor of either House. The prospect of securing through legislation a 
rule better styled to achieve fair dispositions in negligence cases does not appear to be bright. Id. 
at 450.  
(n133) See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, Section 1.4(B), at 13.  
(n134) Id. at 13-14.  
(n135) Id. Subsection 1.5(D) & (E), at 21-27.  
(n136) See cases cited for this proposition from N.M., Mich., W. Va., Cal., Alaska and Fla. in 
Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 895 (Ill. 1981).  
(n137) See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
(n138) Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).  
(n139) 229 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968).  
(n140) Id. at 290.  
(n141) See Isackson, supra note 116, at 609 (noting that "in a Vanderbilt University Symposium, 
five out of the six participants favored the idea of judicial change"); Comment, Comments on 
Maki v. Frelk -- Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature 
Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889, 899 (1968).  
(n142) 239 N.E.2d at 447.  
(n143) 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981).  
(n144) Id. at 898. The court disagreed with the defense's contention that the failure of the Illinois 
General Assembly to enact any of the six bills introduced since 1976 was "a sign of the General 
Assembly's desire to retain the present [contributory negligence] status of the rule." Id. at 895. 
Rather, the inaction can be attributed "`to its feeling that it is more appropriate, considering the 
history of the question in Illinois, for the judiciary to act.'" Id. (quoting Maki, 239 N.E.2d at 450 
(Ward, J., dissenting)).  
We believe that the proper relationship between the legislature and the court is one of 
cooperation and assistance in examining and changing the common law to conform with the 
ever-changing demands of the community. There are, however, times when there exists a mutual 
state of inaction in which the court awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits 
guidance from the court. Such a stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public.  
Id. at 896.  
(n145) Id. at 898.  
(n146) 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1107,1, 5/2-1116, 5/2-1117 (West 1990) (as renumbered).  
(n147) Id. at Section 5/2-1107.1.  
(n148) See, e.g., David Frum, Tort Reform, One Step Forward, One Step Back, WALL ST. J., 
May 27, 1992, at A15; Ellen J. Pollack, Quayle Calls for Changes in Legal System, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 14, 1991, at B10; Aric Press et al., Are Lawyers Burning America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 
20, 1995, at 32.  
(n149) Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 224 
(West) (codified in scattered sections of ILL. COMP. STAT. chs. 430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, 
820 (West Supp. 1996). The Act is reprinted with strikeouts from, and additions to, the old 
statute at 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 819 (1996). See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape as 
Congress Struggles to Rewrite the Nation's Tort Laws, The States Already may Have Done the 
Job, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 57 ("The new Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 are touted 
as the most comprehensive changes in tort law adopted by a state legislature."). For overviews of 
the Act, see Michael Gallegher et al., Illinois Tort Reform: The Judge's Perspective, 84 ILL B.J. 
124 (1996); J. Jeffrey Zimmerman et al., A Review of the Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1995, 83 ILL. B.J. 282 (1995).  
(n150) See Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy Explanation, 
27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 803, 814-16 (1996).  
(n151) Id. at 813-14.  
(n152) 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21107.1 (West 1990) (as renumbered).  
(n153) The old "sunshine" section 5/2-1107.1, id., with strikeouts and additions to convert it into 
the new "blindfold" section is reproduced in its entirety supra note 12 (emphasis added).  
(n154) See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
(n155) 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1107.1 (West 1996) (emphasis added).  
(n156) Gallegher et al., supra note 149, at 130.  
(n157) Id.  
(n158) The empirical work that has been done on jury decision-making is concentrated in the 
social science literature. For two surveys of this literature, its contributions and limitations, see 
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research on Juror and 
Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90 (1990); Nancy 
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Jury Decision-Making Models: The Generaliza-tion Gap, 89 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981). See also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); 
Franklin J. Boster et al., An Information-processing Model of Jury Decision Making; 18 COMM. 
RES. 524 (1991). Most of this work has focused on the criminal jury process: see, e.g., Mark 
Constanzo & Sally Constanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase, 16 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1992); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury 
Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455 (1995). Much of the 
empirical work published to date studies the effects of personal attributes of jurors, race and 
socio-economic background, or deliberation style on jury decisions: see. e.g., Jeffrey R. Boyll, 
Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal Factors in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 163 (1991); Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in 
Wrongful Death Awards, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 263 (1991). Relatively few works consider 
the effects of differences in legal rules on jury decisions, but see Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury 
Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments and Challenges on Jury Decision 
Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988); Ronald J. Matlon et al., Factors Affecting Jury 
Decision-making, 12 SOC. ACTION & L. 41 (1986):  
It is somewhat surprising that relatively little empirical research has been devoted to comparing 
the impact of extralegal factors to the various essential content-oriented (legal) aspects of the 
trial itself on the decisions of the juries. Essential content-oriented aspects of a trial may be 
described as the established conventions of the court which constitute the substance of the trial, 
such as opening statements, direct testimony by witnesses, direct and cross-examination from 
counsel, objections, exhibits, closing arguments, and judge's instructions.  
Id. at 41-42.  
(n159) The transcripts of the two simulation versions of McKey v. Torino Pizza Inc., including 
instructions and verdict forms, and exhibits are on file with the authors at the office of Professor 
Jordan H. Leibman, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 801 W. Michigan St., 
Indianapolis IN, 46202.  
(n160) We would have preferred uniform juries of six persons, the standard civil jury size in 
Indiana, but our viewing groups of subjects rarely proved to be evenly divisible by six.  
(n161) The Base juries rendered what were essentially "special verdicts" because, after 
determining percentages of fault and amount of damages by the juries, it would be necessary for 
the court to adjust these verdicts to conform to the 51% percentage bar. The Variant juries 
rendered "general verdicts with special interrogatories" in which the jury determines the ultimate 
outcome of their findings. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text for an explanation of 
these two forms of verdict.  
(n162) In exchange for the use of the physical evidence in possession of the plaintiffs attorney, 
we agreed to protect the privacy of the parties by withholding all names, the exact locations of 
the relevant incidents, and the name of the case. In this article, we refer to the actual case upon 
which the simulation was based as the "underlying case."  
(n163) These facts and those in the following paragraphs are essentially the same in the 
underlying case.  
(n164) In the underlying case there was virtually no possibility for the plaintiff to recover 
damages from the State. IND. CODE Sections 34-4-33-8 (Supp. 1984) provides that the 
Comparative Fault Act "does not apply . . . to tort claims against governmental entities .... " With 
respect to the State, contributory negligence remains a complete defense. Under the facts of 
McKey, some negligence on Dawn's part is conceded by the plaintiff. Presumably, the State was 
named as a party defendant to attract a portion of the fault that might otherwise be attributed to 
Dawn. Because Indiana is a modified comparative fault state with a 51% bar to recovery, see 
supra note 6, it was important for the plaintiff to make it as easy as possible for the jury to assign 
at least 50% to the defendants. The defense was probably ambivalent about this strategy because 
it could not be confident that Dawn would be found more than 50% responsible for her own 
injuries. It, therefore, may have welcomed the opportunity to lay off part of the fault on another 
defendant In any event, the jury knew none of this and had to assume that the State would pay its 
share of any damages assessed against it.  
(n165) See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.  
(n166) Standard deviation was 6.3.  
(n167) Only one juror was 17, the remainder were "jury-eligible" with respect to age. About 11% 
were at least 30 years of age; 65% were between 19 and 22 years old. These student juries were 
no doubt younger than those typically encountered in the "real world," but they were older on 
average than might be surmised from their sophomore/junior status.  
(n168) Simulated Trial Transcript, McKey v. Torino Pizza Co., Inc., Variant version at 
INSTRUC7-1 (on file with the authors, see supra note 159).  
(n169) Id. at CLOS7-6.  
(n170) Id. at CLOS7-21.  
(n171) Two of the Variant juries were hung. Their verdict data is not included in the analysis.  
(n172) As it turned out, Dawn's negligence was deemed by the average blindfold jury to be 
significantly higher than 50%. See Table 3. The mean percentage of fault attributable to her by 
these juries -- who were unaware that a 51% or higher finding would bar her -- was 65.6%. This 
relatively high degree of negligence proved to be a significant hurdle for those Variant juries that 
wished to award her damages. See infra note 191 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
problem.  
(n173) See supra text accompanying and surrounding notes 166-67 (discussing the origin and 
demographics of the subjects who served as mock jurors).  
(n174) See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
(n175) Id.  
(n176) See infra Table 1, col. 10.  
(n177) See infra Table 3, col. 6.  
(n178) This test (a.k.a. 2-sample difference of means test) is appropriate when one wishes to 
compare two observed sample means to statistically assess whether two different samples came 
from populations having equal means. DONALD R. HARNETT, STATISTICAL METHODS 
376 (3d ed.1982). In this instance we used the t-distribution and the corresponding t-test 
difference of means, because we operate under the assumption that the population variances are 
not known. Inasmuch as we used the sample variances, the t-test is appropriate. For a more 
thorough discussion of this test, see HARNETT, supra, at 345-80; UMA SEKARAN, 
RESEARCH METHODS FOR BUSINESS: A SKILL BUILDING APPROACH 249-50 (2d ed. 
1992).  
(n179) See infra Table 1, col. 6.  
(n180) See infra Table 3, col. 6.  
(n181) See supra Table 1, col. 8.  
(n182) See supra Table 3, col. 8.  
(n183) See supra note 165 and accompanying text. The plaintiff sought to have fault allocated to 
the State sufficient to produce an award, but not so much as to excessively dissipate collectible 
damages (the State being essentially immune from having to pay damages, see supra note 164 
and accompanying text). The defense was interested in shifting its fault to the State, but not so 
much as to bring Dawn's fault below 51%.  
(n184) See infra Table 4, col. 12.  
(n185) See infra Table 5, col. 12.  
(n186) Of the sunshine jurors, 12.6% neither agreed nor disagreed; 49.8% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement. We were surprised how many jurors felt this influence, were 
prepared to act on it, and were willing to admit that they were acting beyond the judicial charge.  
(n187) Of these jurors, 15.4% neither agreed nor disagreed, while 47.3% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.  
(n188) See supra Table 2; 12 of 39 blindfold juries, or 31%, produced an award for Dawn.  
(n189) See supra Table 3; 17 of 43 sunshine juries, or 40%, produced an award.  
(n190) The z-test difference of proportions (a.k.a. 2-sample difference of proportions test) is 
appropriate when one wishes to compare two observed sample proportions to statistically assess 
whether two different samples came from populations having equal proportions. HARNETT, 
supra note 178, at 401. For a more thorough discussion of this test, see id. at 401-02; WILLIAM 
R. DILLON ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MARKETING RESEARCH 418-20 (1993).  
(n191) See supra Table 1, col. 12.  
(n192) Running more iterations for both samples might settle this question.  
(n193) See supra Table 3, col. 11. The mean award to Dawn is the sum of the damages assessed 
against Torino and the State of Indiana.  
(n194) See supra Table 2, col. 1.1.  
(n195) See infra Table 6, col. 11.  
(n196) See supra Table 7, col. 11.  
(n197) The Median as a Measure of Central Tendency. Although policy makers are more likely 
to be concerned about mean results, practitioners are likely to be more interested in the typicality 
of an experimental outcome. If, for example, an attorney is representing a client like Torino 
Pizza Company, he will want to know what the typical verdict result in such cases has been. 
With respect to the percentage of fault attributed to Torino by the blindfold sample, the data are 
positively skewed. Torino's mean fault in the blindfold sample is 16.3%, but the median is 12%. 
The attorney should probably tell his client to contemplate a 12% finding, rather than 16.3%, but 
he should caution the client that: some large findings of fault by blindfold juries against 
corporate defendants have been recorded. For each of the parameters we have so far considered, 
both of these measures of central tendency should be considered.  
(n198) See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, Section 67, at 469 ("Courts have become 
more reluctant to rule that the plaintiff's conduct is negligent as a matter of law, and juries are 
notoriously inclined to find there has been no such negligence, or to make some more or less 
haphazard reduction of the plaintiffs damages in proportion to his fault.").  
(n199) See supra Table 1, col. 11.  
(n200) See supra Table 2, col. 11.  
(n201) See supra Table 3, col. 11.  
(n202) See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.  
(n203) Daniel R. Ilgen, Laboratory Research: A Question of When, Not If, in GENERALIZING 
FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS 257, 257-58 (Edwin E. Locke ed. 1986). For 
further commentary on the lab versus field issue, see John P. Cambell, Labs, Fields, and Straw 
Issues and Generalizing from Laboratory to Field: Ecological Validity or Abstraction of 
Essential Elements, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS, 
supra, at 269 and 3 respectively.  
(n204) Id.  
(n205) Id. at 258.  
(n206) See supra text accompanying note 162.  
(n207) On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree) the mean responses to the 5 items were 2.44, 
2.49, 1.97, 1.90, 1.88 respectively. Jurors also reported that they had plenty of time to reach a 
verdict. Exit survey forms are on file with the authors, see supra note 159.  
(n208) See supra text accompanying note 203,  
(n209) See GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS (Edwin A. Locke 
ed. 1986) (citing numerous instances from the behavioral literature where lab studies have been 
replicated in the field with similar results).  
(n210) For an outstanding example of the risk-taking mentality of some tort lawyers, see HARR, 
supra note 69.  
(n211) The authors have plans to replicate this experiment using subjects recruited from the jury 
rolls of Hendricks County, Indiana.  
(n212) Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, Nos. 81890, 81891, 81892, 81893 cons., 1997 Ill. LEXIS 
478, at *155 (IlL Dec. 18, 1997).  
(n213) "The cap on compensatory damages for noneconomic injury is, as the parties 
acknowledge, at the heart of [Civil Justice Reform Act] Public Act 89-7." Id. at *17 (discussing 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West 1996)).  
(n214) Id. at *155 (discussing 735 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/2-1107.1) (West 1997).  
(n215) Id. at *156.  
(n216) Id. at *155.  
(n217) Shortly after the supreme court struck down the Civil Justice Reform Act, a spokesman 
for the Speaker of Illinois House of Representatives was reported to have said "that the speaker 
would be willing to discuss legislation that would re-enact provisions the Supreme Court had not 
singled out and ruled invalid." Supporters of the Act were reported to have "voiced skepticism 
regarding their chances if the Chicago Democrat remains in control of the Illinois House of 
Representatives." David Heckleman, As Dem Leader Ponders Reviving Some Reforms, 
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL, Dec. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.  
(n218) Best, 1997 Ill. LEXIS 478, at *17-23 & n.1 (discussing affidavits submitted by Professor 
Nell Vidmar of the Duke Law School, Professor Marc Galanter, of the University of Wisconsin 
Law School, and a joint affidavit from Stephen Daniels, a senior research fellow at the American 
Bar Foundation and Joanne Martin, an assistant director of the Foundation).  
(n219) Professor Vidmar cited an Indiana study that showed an increase in malpractice claims 
following the capping of malpractice damages, Id. at *20 n.1; Professor Galanter submitted data 
showing that court filings in Cook County actually declined during the period 1980-94 (prior to 
the tort reform legislation) Id. at *20; and Daniels and Martin summarized empirical studies 
showing "that only a tiny fraction of accidental deaths and injuries are pursued through the 
litigation system as claims for compensation," Id. at *22.  
(n220) Id. at *23.  
(n221) Id. at *18.  
(n222) Id. at *23-24.  
TABLE 1 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. BASE ("BLINDFOLD") SAMPLE DATA 
BEFORE ADJUSTMENT FOR MOD. COMP. FAULT 
1          2         3       4      5       6              $7 
NO.      PANEL     DATE     VERS    HU    TORINO      TOR-DAMAGES 
 
                                             %              $ 
 
1         B101      7/17     B             12.0%         $240,000 
2         B109     10/12     B             34.0%         $899,314 
3         B110     10/12     B              0.0%               $0 
4         B111     10/12     B             40.0%       $1,400,000 
5         B112     10/12     B              0.0%               $0 
6         B113     10/12     B             35.0%       $2,100,000 
7         B114     10/12     B              5.0%          $92,500 
8         C101      9/7      B             30.0%         $802,050 
9         C102      9/7      B              5.0%         $272,200 
10        C103      9/7      B             20.0%         $450,000 
11        C104      9/7      B             23.0%       $1,369,644 
12        C105      9/7      B             10.0%         $336,960 
13        C106      9/7      B             30.0%       $1,357,572 
14        E101      9/10     B             15.0%         $267,974 
15        E102      9/10     B             15.0%         $828,786 
16        E103      9/10     B             15.0%         $375,000 
17        E104      9/10     B              0.0%               $0 
18        E105      9/10     B             30.0%       $1,830,000 
19        E106      9/10     B              0.0%               $0 
20        F101      9/20     B              0.0%               $0 
21        F102      9/20     B              5.0%          $11,005 
22        G201     10/15     B             20.0%         $600,000 
23        G202     10/5      B             10.0%         $600,000 
24        H101     10/20     B             30.0%       $1,290,000 
25        H102     10/20     B             50.0%       $2,993,760 
26        H103     10/20     B             55.0%       $3,300,000 
27        H104     10/20     B              0.0%               $0 
28        H105     10/20     B              5.0%         $360,000 
29        H106     10/20     B             10.0%          $22,010 
30        H107     10/20     B             15.0%         $900,000 
31        H108     10/20     B             15.0%         $155,087 
32        H109     10/20     B              0.0%               $0 
33        H110     10/20     B              0.0%               $0 
34        H111     10/20     B              0.0%               $0 
35        H112     10/20     B             10.0%         $280,354 
36        H113     10/20     B             10.0%         $100,000 
37        H114     10/20     B              0.0%               $0 
38        H115     10/20     B             25.0%         $717,400 
39        H116     10/20     B             55.0%       $3,685,000 
 
MEANS                                      16.3%         $708,631 
MEDIANS                                    12.0%         $336,960 
ST. DEV.                                    0.159        $946,528 
 
1              8              9           10            11 
NO.          STATE       ST-DAMAGES     TOR+ST        TOR+ST 
 
               %               $           %             $ 
 
1             8.0%          $160,000     20.0%        $400,000 
2             0.0%                $0     34.0%        $899,314 
3            66.0%        $2,970,000     66.0%      $2,970,000 
4            20.0%          $700,000     60.0%      $2,100,000 
5             5.0%          $173,643      5.0%        $173,643 
6             0.0%                $0     35.0%      $2,100,000 
7            35.0%          $647,500     40.0%        $740,000 
8            30.0%          $802,050     60.0%      $1,604,100 
9             5.0%          $272,200     10.0%        $544,400 
10           50.0%        $1,125,000     70.0%      $1,575,000 
11           23.0%        $1,369,644     46.0%      $2,739,287 
12           20.0%          $673,920     30.0%      $1,010,880 
13           40.0%        $1,810,096     70.0%      $3,167,668 
14           15.0%          $267,974     30.0%        $535,948 
15           35.0%        $1,933,834     50.0%      $2,762,620 
16           10.0%          $250,000     25.0%        $625,000 
17            0.0%                $0      0.0%              $0 
18           40.0%        $2,440,000     70.0%      $4,270,000 
19           10.0%          $122,010     10.0%        $122,010 
20           10.0%          $174,485     10.0%        $174,485 
21           10.0%           $22,010     15.0%         $33,015 
22            5.0%          $150,000     25.0%        $750,000 
23           40.0%        $2,400,000     50.0%      $3,000,000 
24           10.0%          $430,000     40.0%      $1,720,000 
25           15.0%          $898,128     65.0%      $3,891,888 
26            5.0%          $300,000     60.0%      $3,600,000 
27            0.0%                $0      0.0%              $0 
28            5.0%          $360,000     10.0%        $720,000 
29           20.0%           $44,020     30.0%         $66,030 
30           35.0%        $2,100,000     50.0%      $3,000,000 
31           15.0%          $155,087     30.0%        $310,173 
32           10.0%          $452,524     10.0%        $452,524 
33           10.0%          $344,637     10.0%        $344,637 
34            0.0%                $0      0.0%              $0 
35           25.0%          $700,885     35.0%        $981,239 
36           25.0%          $250,000     35.0%        $350,000 
37           20.0%          $689,274     20.0%        $689,274 
38            0.0%                $0     25.0%        $717,400 
39           35.0%        $2,345,000     90.0%      $6,030,000 
 
MEANS        18.1%          $705,998     34.4%      $1,414,629 
MEDIANS      15.0%          $344,637     30.0%        $740,000 
ST. DEV.      0.159         $828,617     23.4%      $1,456,807 
 
1              12             13                  14 
NO.           DAWN       DAWN-DAMAGES        TOTAL DAMAGES 
 
                %              $                   $ 
 
1             80.0%        $1,600,000          $2,000,000 
2             66.0%        $1,745,726          $2,645,040 
3             34.0%        $1,530,000          $4,500,000 
4             40.0%        $1,400,000          $3,500,000 
5             95.0%        $3,299,217          $3,472,860 
6             65.0%        $3,900,000          $6,000,000 
7             60.0%          $110,000          $1,850,000 
8             40.0% 
9             90.0%       $41,899,600          $5,444,000 
10            30.0%          $675,000          $2,250,000 
11            54.0%        $3,215,685          $5,954,972 
12            70.0%        $2,358,720          $3,369,600 
13            30.0%        $1,357,572          $4,525,240 
14            70.0%        $1,250,544          $1,786,492 
15            50.0%        $2,762,620          $5,525,240 
16            75.0%        $1,875,000          $2,500,000 
17           100.0%                $0                  $0 
18            30.0%        $1,830,000          $6,100,000 
19            90.0%        $1,098,090          $1,220,100 
20            90.0%        $1,570,365          $1,774,850 
21            85.0%          $187,085            $220,100 
22            75.0%        $2,250,000          $3,000,000 
23            50.0%        $3,000,000          $6,000,000 
24            60.0%        $2,580,000          $4,300,000 
25            35.0%        $2,095,632          $5,987,520 
26            40.0%        $2,400,000          $6,000,000 
27           100.0%                $0                  $0 
28            90.0%        $6,480,000          $7,200,000 
29            70.0%          $154,070            $220,100 
30            50.0%        $3,000,000          $6,000,000 
31            70.0%          $723,738          $1,033,911 
32            90.0%        $4,072,716          $4,525,240 
33            90.0%        $3,101,733          $3,446,370 
34           100.0%                $0                  $0 
35            65.0%        $1,822,302          $2,803,541 
36            65.0%          $650,000          $1,000,000 
37            80.0%        $2,757,096          $3,446,370 
38            75.0%        $2,152,200          $2,869,600 
39            10.0%          $670,000          $6,700,000 
 
MEANS         65.6%        $1,965,234          $3,379,863 
MEDIANS       70.0%        $1,822,302          $3,369,600 
ST. DEV.      23.4%        $1,402,757          $2,120,585 
TABLE 2 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. BASE ("BLINDFOLD") SAMPLE DATA 
AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR MOD. COMP. FAULT 
1         2        3         4      5       6            7 
NO.     PANEL     DATE      VERS.   HU    TORINO     TOR-DAMAGES 
 
                                             %           $ 
 
1       B101       7/17       B            12.0%             $0 
2       B109      10/12       B            34.0%             $0 
3       B110      10/12       B             0.0%             $0 
4       B111      10/12       B            40.0%     $1,400,000 
5       B112      10/12       B             0.0%             $0 
6       B113      10/12       B            35.0%             $0 
7       B114      10/12       B             5.0%             $0 
8       C101       9/7        B            30.0%       $802,050 
9       C102       9/7        B             5.0%             $0 
10      C103       9/7        B            20.0%       $450,000 
11      C104       9/7        B            23.0%             $0 
12      C105       9/7        B            10.0%             $0 
13      C106       9/7        B            30.0%     $1,357,572 
14      E101       9/10       B            15.0%             $0 
15      E102       9/10       B            15.0%       $828,786 
16      E103       9/10       B            15.0%             $0 
17      E104       9/10       B             0.0%             $0 
18      E105       9/10       B            30.0%     $1,830,000 
19      E106       9/10       B             0.0%             $0 
20      F101       9/20       B             0.0%             $0 
21      F102       9/20       B             5.0%             $0 
22      G201       10/5       B            20.0%             $0 
23      G202       10/5       B            10.0%       $600,000 
24      H101      10/20       B            30.0%             $0 
25      H102      10/20       B            50.0%     $2,993,760 
26      H103      10/20       B            55.0%     $3,300,000 
27      H104      10/20       B             0.0%             $0 
28      H105      10/20       B             5.0%             $0 
29      H106      10/20       B            10.0%             $0 
30      H107      10/20       B            15.0%       $900,000 
31      H108      10/20       B            15.0%             $0 
32      H109      10/20       B             0.0%             $0 
33      H110      10/20       B             0.0%             $0 
34      H111      10/20       B             0.0%             $0 
35      H112      10/20       B            10.0%             $0 
36      H113      10/20       B            10.0%             $0 
37      H114      10/20       B             0.0%             $0 
38      H115      10/20       B            25.0%             $0 
39      H116      10/20       B            55.0%     $3,685,000 
 
MEANS                                      16.3%       $465,312 
MEDIANS                                    12.0%             $0 
ST. DEV.                                    0.159      $957,550 
 
1            8               9             10              11 
NO.        STATE         ST-DAMAGES      TOR+ST          TOR+ST 
 
              %              $              %               $ 
 
1           8.0%                 $0       20.0%                $0 
2           0.0%                 $0       34.0%                $0 
3          66.0%         $2,970,000       66.0%        $2,970,000 
4          20.0%           $700,000       60.0%        $2,970,000 
5           5.0%                 $0        5.0%                $0 
6           0.0%                 $0       35.0%                $0 
7          35.0%                 $0       40.0%                $0 
8          30.0%           $802,050       60.0%        $1,604,100 
9           5.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
10         50.0%         $1,125,000       70.0%        $1,575,000 
11         23.0%                 $0       46.0%                $0 
12         20.0%                 $0       30.0%                $0 
13         40.0%         $1,810,096       70.0%        $3,167,688 
14         15.0%                 $0       30.0%                $0 
15         35.0%         $1,933,834       50.0%        $2,762,620 
16         10.0%                 $0       25.0%                $0 
17          0.0%                 $0        0.0%                $0 
18         40.0%         $2,440,000       70.0%        $4,270,000 
19         10.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
20         10.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
21         10.0%                 $0       15.0%                $0 
22          5.0%                 $0       25.0%                $0 
23         40.0%         $2,400,000       50.0%        $3,000,000 
24         10.0%                 $0       40.0%                $0 
25         15.0%           $898,128       65.0%        $3,891,888 
26          5.0%           $300,000       60.0%        $3,600,000 
27          0.0%                 $0        0.0%                $0 
28          5.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
29         20.0%                 $0       30.0%                $0 
30         35.0%         $2,100,000       50.0%        $3,000,000 
31         15.0%                 $0       30.0%                $0 
32         10.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
33         10.0%                 $0       10.0%                $0 
34          0.0%                 $0        0.0%                $0 
35         25.0%                 $0       35.0%                $0 
36         25.0%                 $0       35.0%                $0 
37         20.0%                 $0       20.0%                $0 
38          0.0%                 $0       25.0%                $0 
39         35.0%         $2,345,000       90.0%        $6,030,000 
 
MEANS      18.3%           $508,310       34.4%          $973,622 
MEDIANS    15.0%                 $0       30.0%                $0 
ST. DEV.    0.157          $898,514        0.234       $1,619,631 
 
1            12                 13                   14 
NO.         DAWN           DAWN-DAMAGES         TOTAL DAMAGES 
 
              %                  $                    $ 
1           80.0%                    $0                   $0 
2           66.0%                    $0                   $0 
3           34.0%            $1,530,000           $4,500,000 
4           40.0%            $1,400,000           $3,500,000 
5           95.0%                    $0                   $0 
6           65.0%                    $0                   $0 
7           60.0%                    $0                   $0 
8           40.0%            $1,069,400           $2,673,500 
9           90.0%                    $0                   $0 
10          30.0%              $675,000           $2,250,000 
11          54.0%                    $0                   $0 
12          70.0%                    $0                   $0 
13          30.0%            $1,357,572           $4,525,240 
14          70.0%                    $0                   $0 
15          50.0%            $2,762,620           $5,525,240 
16          75.0%                    $0                   $0 
17         100.0%                    $0                   $0 
18          30.0%            $1,830,000           $6,100,000 
19          90.0%                    $0                   $0 
20          90.0%                    $0                   $0 
21          85.0%                    $0                   $0 
22          75.0%                    $0                   $0 
23          50.0%            $3,000,000           $6,000,000 
24          60.0%                    $0                   $0 
25          35.0%            $2,095,632           $5,987,520 
26          40.0%            $2,400,000           $6,000,000 
27         100.0%                    $0                   $0 
28          90.0%                    $0                   $0 
29          70.0%                    $0                   $0 
30          50.0%            $3,000,000           $6,000,000 
31          70.0%                    $0                   $0 
32          90.0%                    $0                   $0 
33          90.0%                    $0                   $0 
34         100.0%                    $0                   $0 
35          65.0%                    $0                   $0 
36          65.0%                    $0                   $0 
37          80.0%                    $0                   $0 
38          75.0%                    $0                   $0 
39          10.0%              $670,000           $6,700,000 
 
MEANS       65.6%              $558,724           $1,532,346 
MEDIANS     70.0%                    $0                   $0 
ST. DEV.     0.234             $961,769           $2,460,698 
TABLE 3 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. VARIANT ("SUNSHINE") SAMPLE 
DATA 
1           2         3        4      5       6           $7 
NO.       PANEL     DATE     VERS.    HU    TORINO    TOR-DAMAGES 
 
                                             %            $ 
 
1          B103     10/5      V3            60.0%      $6,000,000 
2          B104     10/5      V3            10.0%              $0 
3          B105     10/5      V3            40.0%              $0 
4          B106     10/5      V3            25.0%              $0 
5          B107     10/5      V3            15.0%              $0 
6          B108     10/5      V3            49.0%      $2,524,625 
7          C107      9/6      V3            40.0%      $2,400,000 
8          C108      9/6      V3     HU 
9          C109      9/6      V3            30.0%              $0 
10         C110      916      V3            44.0%      $2,640,000 
11         C111      9/6      V3            40.0%      $1,400,000 
12         C112      9/6      V3            20.0%              $0 
13         C113      9/6      V3            25.0%              $0 
14         D101      8/14     V3            35.0%              $0 
15         D102      8/14     V3            10.0%              $0 
16         D103      8/14     V3     HU 
17         E201      9/11     V3            30.0%              $0 
18         E202      9/11     V3            10.0%              $0 
19         E201      9/11     V3            51.0%        $892,316 
20         E204      9/11     V3            40.0%      $1,700,000 
21         E205      9/11     V3            10.0%        $172,010 
22         E206      9/11     V3            50.0%      $2,262,620 
23         F201      9/20     V3            52.0%      $1,458,937 
24         F202      9/20     V3            11.0%              $0 
25         F203      9/20     V3            15.0%              $0 
26         F204      9/20     V3            48.0%        $105,648 
27         G101     10/5      V3             0.0%              $0 
28         G102     10/5      V3            15.0%              $0 
29         G103     10/5      V3            75.0%      $5,519,861 
30         G104     10/5      V3            30.0%              $0 
31         G105     10/5      V3            20.0%        $117,647 
32         I201     10/31     V3            30.0%              $0 
33         I202     10/31     V3            35.0%              $0 
34         I203     10/31     V3             9.0%              $0 
35         I204     10/31     V3            35.0%              $0 
36         I205     10/31     V3             0.0%              $0 
37         I206     10/31     V3            55.0%      $3,850,000 
38         I207     10/31     V3            25.0%              $0 
39         I208     10/31     V3            50.0%      $2,977,486 
40         I209     10/31     V3            23.0%              $0 
41         U101      1/23     V3            30.0%              $0 
42         U102      1/23     V3            25.0%              $0 
43         U103      1/23     V3            15.0%        $300,000 
44         U104      1/23     V3            20.0%              $0 
45         U105      1/23     V3             8.0%         $64,000 
 
MEANS                                       29.3%        $799,655 
MEDIANS                                     30.0%              $0 
ST. DEV.                                    17.4%      $1,502,432 
 
1            8             9            10             11 
NO.         STATE      ST-DAMAGES      TOR+ST         TOR+ST 
 
              %            $              %              $ 
 
1           10.0%      $1,000,000      70.0%      $7,000,000 
2           30.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
3            9.0%              $0      49.0%              $0 
4           24.0%              $0      49.0%              $0 
5           33.0%              $0      48.0%              $0 
6           10.0%        $515,230      59.0%      $3,039,854 
7           20.0%      $1,200,000      60.0%      $3,600,000 
8 
9           10.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
10          25.0%      $1,500,000      69.0%      $4,140,000 
11          10.0%        $350,000      50.0%      $1,750,000 
12          20.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
13           0.0%              $0      25.0%              $0 
14           0.0%              $0      35.0%              $0 
15          15.0%              $0      25.0%              $0 
16 
17          10.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
18          20.0%              $0      30.0%              $0 
19           1.0%         $17,496      52.0%        $909,813 
20          20.0%        $850,000      60.0%      $2,550,000 
21          41.0%        $705,241      51.0%        $877,251 
22          20.0%        $905,048      70.0%      $3,167,668 
23          10.0%        $280,565      62.0%      $1,739,502 
24          11.0%              $0      22.0%              $0 
25           5.0%              $0      20.0%              $0 
26           2.0%          $4,402      50.0%        $110,050 
27          15.0%              $0      15.0%              $0 
28          10.0%              $0      25.0%              $0 
29           0.0%              $0      75.0%      $5,519,861 
30          10.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
31          31.0%        $182,353      51.0%        $300,000 
32          10.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
33           0.0%              $0      35.0%              $0 
34          40.0%              $0      49.0%              $0 
35          10.0%              $0      45.0%              $0 
36          10.0%              $0      10.0%              $0 
37          10.0%        $700,000      65.0%      $4,550,000 
38          15.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
39          10.0%        $595,497      60.0%      $3,572,983 
40           2.0%              $0      25.0%              $0 
41           0.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
42           5.0%              $0      30.0%              $0 
43          36.0%        $720,000      51.0%      $1,020,000 
44          10.0%              $0      30.0%              $0 
45          43.0%        $344,000      51.0%        $408,000 
 
MEANS       14.7%        $229,531      44.0%      $1,029,186 
MEDIANS     10.0%              $0      40.0%              $0 
ST. DEV.    11.6%        $391,735      15.7%      $1,774,573 
 
1            12               13                  14 
NO.         DAWN        DAWN-DAMAGES        TOTAL DAMAGES 
 
             %                 $                   $ 
 
1          30.0%         $3,000,000         $10,000,000 
2          60.0%                 $0                  $0 
3          51.0%                 $0                  $0 
4          51.0%                 $0                  $0 
5          52.0%                 $0                  $0 
6          41.0%         $2,112,441          $5,152,295 
7          40.0%         $2,400,000          $6,000,000 
8 
9          60.0%                 $0                  $0 
10         31.0%         $1,860,000          $6,000,000 
11         50.0%         $1,750,000          $3,500,000 
12         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
13         75.0%                 $0                  $0 
14         65.0%                 $0                  $0 
15         75.0%                 $0                  $0 
16 
17         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
18         70.0%                 $0                  $0 
19         48.0%           $839,827          $1,749,640 
20         40.0%         $1,700,000          $4,250,000 
21         49.0%           $842,849          $1,720,100 
22         30.0%         $1,357,572          $4,525,240 
23         38.0%         $1,066,146          $2,805,648 
24         78.0%                 $0                  $0 
25         80.0%                 $0                  $0 
26         50.0%           $110,050            $220,100 
27         85.0%                 $0                  $0 
28         75.0%                 $0                  $0 
29         25.0%         $1,839,954          $7,359,815 
30         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
31         49.0%           $288,235          $5,882,351 
32         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
33         65.0%                 $0                  $0 
34         51.0%                 $0                  $0 
35         55.0%                 $0                  $0 
36         90.0%                 $0                  $0 
37         35.0%         $2,450,000          $7,000,000 
38         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
39         40.0%         $2,381,989          $5,954,972 
40         75.0%                 $0                  $0 
41         60.0%                 $0                  $0 
42         70.0%                 $0                  $0 
43         49.0%           $980,000          $2,000,000 
44         70.0%                 $0                  $0 
45         49.0%           $392,000            $800,000 
 
MEANS      56.0%           $590,025          $1,619,210 
MEDIANS    55.0%                 $0                  $0 
ST. DEV.   15.8%           $904,109          $2,646,435 
TABLE 4 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. BASE ("BLINDFOLD") SAMPLE DATA 
JURIES PRODUCING NO AWARD FOR PLAINTIFF 
 1          2       3       4      5      6        $7        8 
 
                                                  TOR.- 
No.        PANEL   DATE    VERS.   HU   TORINO   DAMAGES   STATE 
 
                                          %         $        % 
 
 1         E101     9/10     B          15.0%       $0     15.0% 
 2         H106    10/20     B          10.0%       $0     20.0% 
 3         B113    10/12     B          35.0%       $0      0.0% 
 4         H114    10/20     B           0.0%       $0     20.0% 
 5         H113    10/20     B          10.0%       $0     25.0% 
 6         E104     9/20     B           0.0%       $0      0.0% 
 7         H112    10/20     B          10.0%       $0     25.0% 
 8         B112    10/12     B           0.0%       $0      5.0% 
 9         B109    10/12     B          34.0%       $0      0.0% 
10         C102     9/7      B           5.0%       $0      5.0% 
11         E106     9/10     B           0.0%       $0     10.0% 
12         F101     9/20     B           0.0%       $0     10.0% 
13         F102     9/20     B           5.0%       $0     10.0% 
14         C104     9/7      B          23.0%       $0     23.0% 
15         H108    10/20     B          15.0%       $0     15.0% 
16         H101    10/20     B          30.0%       $0     10.0% 
17         C105     9/7      B          10.0%       $0     20.0% 
18         H104    10/20     B           0.0%       $0      0.0% 
19         H115    10/20     B          25.0%       $0      0.0% 
20         H109    10/20     B           0.0%       $0     10.0% 
21         G201    10/5      B          20.0%       $0      5.0% 
22         B114    10/12     B           5.0%       $0     35.0% 
23         E103     9/10     B          15.0%       $0     10.0% 
24         H110    10/20     B           0.0%       $0     10.0% 
25         H111    10/20     B           0.0%       $0      0.0% 
26         H105    10/20     B           5.0%       $0      5.0% 
27         B101     7/17     B          12.0%       $0      8.0% 
 
MEANS                                   10.5%       $0     11.0% 
MEDIANS                                 10.0%       $0     10.0% 
ST. DEV.                                 0.110      $0      0.090 
 
 1            9        10       11       12       13        14 
 
             ST-                                 DAWN-     TOTAL 
No.        DAMAGES   TOR+ST   TOR+ST    DAWN    DAMAGES   DAMAGES 
 
              $        %         $        %         $        $ 
 
 1            $0     30.0%      $0      70.0%      $0        $0 
 2            $0     30.0%      $0      70.0%      $0        $0 
 3            $0     35.0%      $0      65.0%      $0        $0 
 4            $0     20.0%      $0      80.0%      $0        $0 
 5            $0     35.0%      $0      65.0%      $0        $0 
 6            $0      0.0%      $0     100.0%      $0        $0 
 7            $0     35.0%      $0      65.0%      $0        $0 
 8            $0      5.0%      $0      95.0%      $0        $0 
 9            $0     34.0%      $0      66.0%      $0        $0 
10            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
11            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
12            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
13            $0     15.0%      $0      85.0%      $0        $0 
14            $0     46.0%      $0      54.0%      $0        $0 
15            $0     30.0%      $0      70.0%      $0        $0 
16            $0     40.0%      $0      60.0%      $0        $0 
17            $0     30.0%      $0      70.0%      $0        $0 
18            $0      0.0%      $0     100.0%      $0        $0 
19            $0     25.0%      $0      75.0%      $0        $0 
20            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
21            $0     25.0%      $0      75.0%      $0        $0 
22            $0     40.0%      $0      60.0%      $0        $0 
23            $0     25.0%      $0      75.0%      $0        $0 
24            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
25            $0      0.0%      $0     100.0%      $0        $0 
26            $0     10.0%      $0      90.0%      $0        $0 
27            $0     20.0%      $0      80.0%      $0        $0 
 
MEANS         $0     21.5%      $0      78.5%      $0        $0 
MEDIANS       $0     25.0%      $0      75.0%      $0        $0 
ST. DEV.      $0      0.136     $0       0.136     $0        $0 
TABLE 5 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. VARIANT ("SUNSHINE") SAMPLE 
DATA JURIES PRODUCING NO AWARD FOR PLAINTIFF 
 1          2       3       4      5      6        $7       8 
 
                                                  TOR.- 
No.        PANEL   DATE    VERS.   HU   TORINO   DAMAGES   STATE 
 
                                          %         $        % 
 
  1        C108     9/6     V3     HU 
  2        D103     8/14    V3     HU 
  3        E202     9/11    V3           10.0%      $0     20.0% 
  4        U101     1/23    V3           30.0%      $0     10.0% 
  5        B106    10/5     V3           25.0%      $0     24.0% 
  6        B107    10/5     V3           15.0%      $0     33.0% 
  7        I202     1/23    V3           35.0%      $0      0.0% 
  8        U104     9/6     V3           20.0%      $0     10.0% 
  9        C109    10/5     V3           30.0%      $0     10.0% 
 10        G104    10/5     V3           30.0%      $0     10.0% 
 11        B105     1/23    V3           40.0%      $0      9.0% 
 12        U102    10/31    V3           25.0%      $0      5.0% 
 13        I209     9/6     V3           23.0%      $0      2.0% 
 14        C113    10/31    V3           25.0%      $0      0.0% 
 15        I207     9/6     V3           25.0%      $0     15.0% 
 16        D102     8/14    V3           10.0%      $0     15.0% 
 17        F202     9/20    V3           11.0%      $0     11.0% 
 18        E201     9/11    V3           30.0%      $0     10.0% 
 19        F203     9/20    V3           15.0%      $0      5.0% 
 20        I201    10/31    V3           30.0%      $0     10.0% 
 21        I203    10/31    V3            9.0%      $0     40.0% 
 22        C112     9/6     V3           20.0%      $0     20.0% 
 23        D101     8/14    V3           35.0%      $0      0.0% 
 24        G101    10/5     V3            0.0%      $0     15.0% 
 25        I204    10/31    V3           35.0%      $0     10.0% 
 26        B104    10/5     V3           10.0%      $0     30.0% 
 27        I205    10/31    V3            0.0%      $0     10.0% 
 28        G102    10/5     V3           15.0%      $0     10.0% 
 
MEANS                                    21.3%      $0     12.8% 
MEDIANS                                  10.0%      $0     10.0% 
ST. DEV.                                  0.110     $0      0.101 
 
 1           9         10       11       12       13       14 
 
             ST-                                 DAWN-     TOTAL 
No.        DAMAGES   TOR+ST   TOR+ST    DAWN    DAMAGES   DAMAGES 
 
             $          %        $        %         $        $ 
 
  1 
  2 
  3          $0      30.0%       $0     70.0%      $0       $0 
  4          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
  5          $0      49.0%       $0     51.0%      $0       $0 
  6          $0      48.0%       $0     52.0%      $0       $0 
  7          $0      35.0%       $0     65.0%      $0       $0 
  8          $0      30.0%       $0     70.0%      $0       $0 
  9          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 10          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 11          $0      49.0%       $0     51.0%      $0       $0 
 12          $0      30.0%       $0     70.0%      $0       $0 
 13          $0      25.0%       $0     75.0%      $0       $0 
 14          $0      25.0%       $0     75.0%      $0       $0 
 15          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 16          $0      25.0%       $0     75.0%      $0       $0 
 17          $0      22.0%       $0     78.0%      $0       $0 
 18          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 19          $0      20.0%       $0     80.0%      $0       $0 
 20          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 21          $0      49.0%       $0     51.0%      $0       $0 
 22          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 23          $0      35.0%       $0     65.0%      $0       $0 
 24          $0      15.0%       $0     85.0%      $0       $0 
 25          $0      45.0%       $0     55.0%      $0       $0 
 26          $0      40.0%       $0     60.0%      $0       $0 
 27          $0      10.0%       $0     90.0%      $0       $0 
 28          $0      25.0%       $0     75.0%      $0       $0 
 
MEANS        $0      34.1%       $0     65.9%      $0       $0 
MEDIANS      $0      40.0%       $0     62.5%      $0       $0 





TABLE 6 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. VARIANT ("BLINDFOLD") SAMPLE 
DATA JURIES PRODUCING NO AWARD FOR PLAINTIFF 
 1            2          3          4         5          6 
 
No.          PANEL      DATE       VERS.      HU       TORINO 
 
                                                         % 
 
 1            H116      10/20        B                  55.0% 
 2            C103       9/7         B                  20.0% 
 3            C106       9/7         B                  30.0% 
 4            E105       9/10        B                  30.0% 
 5            B110      10/12        B                   0.0% 
 6            H102      10/20        B                  50.0% 
 7            C101       9/7         B                  30.0% 
 8            B111      10/12        B                  40.0% 
 9            H103      10/20        B                  55.0% 
10            H107      10/20        B                  15.0% 
11            E102       9/10        B                  15.0% 
12            G202      10/5         B                  10.0% 
 
MEANS                                                   29.2% 
MEDIANS                                                 30.0% 
ST. DEV.                                                 0.181 
 
 1                $7             8            9           10 
 
No.          TOR.-DAMAGES      STATE      ST-DAMAGES     TOR+ST 
 
                   $             %            $            % 
 
 1            $3,685,000       35.0%      $2,345,000      90.0% 
 2              $450,000       50.0%      $1,125,000      70.0% 
 3            $1,357,572       40.0%      $1,810,096      70.0% 
 4            $1,830,000       40.0%      $2,440,000      70.0% 
 5                    $0       66.0%      $2,970,000      66.0% 
 6            $2,993,760       15.0%        $898,128      65.0% 
 7              $802,050       30.0%        $802,050      60.0% 
 8            $1,400,000       20.0%        $700,000      60.0% 
 9            $3,300,000        5.0%        $300,000      60.0% 
10              $900,000       35.0%      $2,100,000      50.0% 
11              $828,786       35.0%      $1,933,834      50.0% 
12              $600,000       40.0%      $2,400,000      50.0% 
 
MEANS         $1,512,264       34.3%      $1,652,009      63.4% 
MEDIANS       $1,128,786       35.0%      $1,871,965      62.5% 
ST. DEV.        $120,017        0.16            $625       0.114 
 
 1                11            12            13          14 
 
No.          TOR.-DAMAGES    STATE      ST-DAMAGES     TOR+ST 
 
                   $           %            $            % 
 
 1            $6,030,000     10.0%        $670,000    $6,700,000 
 2           $15,750,001     30.0%        $675,000    $2,250,000 
 3            $3,167,668     30.0%      $1,357,572    $4,525,240 
 4            $4,270,000     30.0%      $1,830,000    $6,100,000 
 5            $2,970,000     34.0%      $1,530,000    $4,500,000 
 6            $3,891,888     35.0%      $2,095,632    $5,987,520 
 7            $1,604,100     40.0%      $1,069,400    $2,673,500 
 8            $2,100,000     40.0%      $1,400,000    $3,500,000 
 9            $3,600,000     40.0%      $2,400,000    $6,000,000 
10            $3,000,000     50.0%      $3,000,000    $6,000,000 
11            $2,762,620     50.0%      $2,762,620    $5,525,240 
12            $3,000,000     50.0%      $3,000,000    $6,000,000 
 
MEANS         $3,164,273     36.6%      $1,815,852    $4,980,125 
MEDIANS       $3,000,000     37.5%      $1,680,000    $5,756,380 
ST. DEV.      $1,224,743      0.114       $839,744    $1,478,538 
 
TABLE 7 MCKEY V. TORINO PIZZA CO., INC. VARIANT ("SUNSHINE") SAMPLE 
DATA JURIES PRODUCING AN AWARD FOR PLAINTIFF 
 1            2          3          4         5          6 
 
No.          PANEL      DATE       VERS.      HU       TORINO 
 
                                                         % 
 
 1            B103      10/5         V3                 60.0% 
 2            I206      10/31        V3                 55.0% 
 3            C107       9/6         V3                 40.0% 
 4            I208      10/31        V3                 50.0% 
 5            B108      10/5         V3                 49.0% 
 6            C110       9/6         V3                 44.0% 
 7            G103      10/5         V3                 75.0% 
 8            C111       9/6         V3                 40.0% 
 9            E204       9/11        V3                 40.0% 
10            E206       9/11        V3                 50.0% 
11            F201       9/20        V3                 52.0% 
12            U103       1/23        V3                 15.0% 
13            E205       9/11        V3                 10.0% 
14            E203       9/11        V3                 51.0% 
15            U105       1/23        V3                  8.0% 
16            G105      10/5         V3                 20.0% 
17            F204       9/20        V3                 48.0% 
 
MEANS                                                   41.6% 
MEDIANS                                                 48.0% 
ST. DEV.                                                0.183 
 
 1                $7             8            9           10 
 
No.          TOR.-DAMAGES      STATE      ST-DAMAGES     TOR+ST 
 
                   $             %            $            % 
 
 1             6,000,000       10.0%       1,000,000      70.0% 
 2             3,850,000       10.0%         700,000      65.0% 
 3             2,400,000       20.0%       1,200,000      60.0% 
 4             2,977,486       10.0%         595,497      60.0% 
 5             2,524,625       10.0%         515,230      59.0% 
 6             2,640,000       25.0%       1,500,000      69.0% 
 7             5,519,861        0.0%               0      75.0% 
 8             1,400,000       10.0%         350,000      50.0% 
 9             1,700,000       20.0%         850,000      60.0% 
10             2,262,620       20.0%         905,048      70.0% 
11             1,458,937       10.0%         280,565      62.0% 
12               300,000       36.0%         720,000      51.0% 
13               172,010       41.0%         705,241      51.0% 
14               892,316        1.0%          17,496      52.0% 
15                64,000       43.0%         344,000      51.0% 
16             1,176,471       31.0%         182,353      51.0% 
17               105,648        2.0%           4,402      50.0% 
 
MEANS         $2,022,656       17.6%        $580,578      59.2% 
MEDIANS       $1,700,000       10.0%        $595,497      60.0% 
ST. DEV.      $1,816,793        0.136       $431,594       0.083 
 
 1               11            12            13           14 
 
No.         TOR.-DAMAGES    STATE      ST-DAMAGES      TOR+ST 
 
                  $           %            $             % 
 
 1           $7,000,000      30.0%     $3,000,000     $10,000,000 
 2           $4,550,000      35.0%     $2,450,000      $7,000,000 
 3           $3,600,000      40.0%     $2,400,000      $6,000,000 
 4           $3,572,983      40.0%     $2,381,989      $5,954,972 
 5           $3,039,854      41.0%     $2,112,441      $5,152,295 
 6           $4,140,000      31.0%     $1,860,000      $6,000,000 
 7           $5,519,861      25.0%     $1,839,954      $7,359,815 
 8           $1,750,000      50.0%     $1,750,000      $3,500,000 
 9           $2,550,000      40.0%     $1,700,000      $4,250,000 
10           $3,167,668      30.0%     $1,357,572      $4,525,240 
11           $1,739,502      38.0%     $1,066,146      $2,805,648 
12           $1,020,000      49.0%       $980,000      $2,000,000 
13             $877,251      49.0%       $842,849      $1,720,100 
14             $909,813      48.0%       $839,827      $1,749,640 
15             $408,000      49.0%       $392,000        $800,000 
16             $300,000      49.0%       $288,235        $588,235 
17             $110,050      50.0%       $110,050        $220,100 
 
MEANS        $2,606,234      40.8%     $1,492,415      $4,095,650 
MEDIANS      $2,550,000      40.0%     $1,700,000      $4,250,000 
ST. DEV.     $1,978,053       0.083      $845,457      $2,758,252 
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